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My dissertation focuses on employers’ strategies to manage the workplace 
through the use of alternative employment contracts.  It consists of three empirical 
studies.  The first study qualitatively explores managers’ interpretations of temporary 
employment contracts.  The findings suggest that the use of temporary employment 
contracts is not merely a cost minimization tactic; rather, it is a strategic response to 
capitalize on market opportunities, to increase managerial authority, and to redistribute 
the economic and legal risks between the employers and the employees. 
In the second study, I examine the effects of organizational and environmental 
characteristics on the spread of temporary employment contracts.  Results of 102 
establishment-level surveys suggest the following findings.  First, establishments 
make greater use of temporary employment contracts when they have access to an 
adequate supply of skilled labor, when market wage rates are high, and when the 
product market is geographically concentrated.  Second, establishments highly 
dependent on state resources tend to provide long-term employment opportunities.  
Finally, as driven by shareholder oriented values and a focus on short-term returns, 
publicly traded companies are more likely than non-listed companies to use temporary 
contracts.  Furthermore, NYSE listed companies are more likely to adopt temporary 
contracts than those listed on the NASDAQ and Chinese stock exchanges. 
The final study investigates the relationship between alternative employment 
strategies, high involvement HR practices, and organizational performance.  Results 
 suggest that establishments that use a majority of temporary contracts are associated 
with low operational performance.  Moreover, high involvement HR practices are 
performance-enhance because employees are competent and motivated to use their 
discretionary effort at work.  Finally, high involvement HR practices moderate the 
relationship between alternative employment strategies and performance.  In particular, 
the negative relationship between alternative employment strategies and performances 
is lower when the company uses more high involvement HR practices.   
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CHAPTER 1 
CHANGING LANDSCAPES OF  
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN CHINA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How an organization manages its human resources is generally seen as a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wright & McMahan, 1992).  Human 
resource management scholars have proposed that firms should optimize the fit 
between human resource practices, organizational functions and processes, and the 
dynamics of the external environment (Wright & Snell, 1998; Batt, 2002).  Prior 
research has suggested that employers should carefully select a group of qualified 
employees, provide extensive training, and design jobs that offer competitive salary, 
favorable work conditions, and job stability, especially in activities that are critical to 
organizational value creation.   
However, in recent years firms have embraced varying degrees of employment 
externalization even in core business functions: they integrate the use of temporary 
employment contracts as part of a long-term organizational strategy (Barley & Kunda, 
2004; Davis-Blake, Broschak, & George, 2003; Lautsch, 2002).  The widespread use 
of temporary employees leads to a breakdown of long-term employment relations and 
internal promotion paths, as well as the expansion of jobs of limited duration and 
careers outside of the corporate hierarchy.  As such, employers expect to gain 
increased discretion in adjusting the number and skill mix of the workforce under 
changing market conditions, while minimizing the economic and social costs 
associated with personnel layoffs. 
To advance our understanding of these alternative approaches to human 
resource management, in this dissertation, I explore the rise of temporary employment 
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contracts and their performance implications.  I focus on the empirical context of 
China because of its rapidly changing environment and comprehensive institutional 
transitions that are occurring (Child, 1994).  Prior to economic reform, employees 
were assigned to state-owned enterprises which guaranteed lifetime employment and a 
wide range of benefits, including housing and education.  Since the 1980s, China has 
enacted fundamental institutional reforms to align the emerging patterns of 
employment relations with increasingly competitive markets.  Firms were encouraged 
to link rewards to performance through the use of bonus systems; they were even 
allowed to dismiss employees under certain circumstances. Moreover, the adoption of 
contract-based employment system in mid 1990s substantially enhanced employers’ 
autonomy in making personnel decisions, including the use of temporary employment 
contracts.  
The dissertation is organized as follows.  First, I present the historical 
background and institutional environment of the rise of temporary employment 
relationships in China.  In the second chapter, I present a qualitative study which 
explores managers’ perceptions of the organizational environment and their 
interpretations of the use of temporary employment contracts.  Next, I draw upon 
original data collected from 102 establishments and examine the influence of labor 
market conditions, product market conditions, political conditions, and financial 
market conditions on the spread of temporary employment contracts.  Chapter 4 
explores how firms mix temporary employees with permanent employees in the same 
service activities and investigates the performance effects of integrating temporary 
work into other components of their human resource systems.  Finally, I summarize 
major findings in these studies and present ideas for future research.   
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
Institutional changes are the central and most consequential contextual feature 
of China’s economic development (Child & Tse, 2001; Guthrie, 1997; Peng & Health, 
1996).  Here I examine some of the critical institutional changes that have occurred 
over the course of China’s economic transition.  I describe how the institutional 
structure of state administration, especially labor regulations, in China’s pre-reform 
industrial economy has had important consequences for the variety of ways that 
companies operate and compete in the transition era.  I also highlight the changes that 
have been central to the reform of Chinese organizations from the perspective of 
company managers.  In this study, I focus on the transformation of employment 
relations in urban, industrial settings.  Changes in rural labor markets are not discussed 
because they represent a distinct social system from the urban system in that they are 
based on historic administrative controls such as house registration, rural commune 
controls, and food rationing. 
China’s industrial labor regulation prior to 1980 was essentially a bureaucratic 
device to support planned economic activities and urban welfare (Frenkel & Kuruvilla, 
2002; Warner, 1997).  The State directly allocated workers to state-own enterprises 
and guaranteed employment for life as well as generous social benefits including 
housing, health care, education, and pensions.  Meanwhile, workers could not change 
jobs unless permitted the current employer.  As White (1987) reported, by the early 
1980s, ninety-seven percent of the state workforce consisted of permanent workers 
with effective job tenure to remain in their enterprise for life.  Over decades, however, 
the administrative control over personnel led to a severe mismatch between labor and 
demand, resulting in widespread overstaffing in state-owned enterprises (Ding, 
Goodall, & Warner, 2000). 
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 China embarked on massive economic reforms in the early 1980s and became 
the largest recipient of foreign direct investment of all developing countires in the 
1990s.  The country started to increasingly engage in international trade.  Companies 
with various ownership arrangements came into operation and proliferated rapidly.  
The State began to reform the system of employment relations to accommodate these 
emerging needs of a market economy.  For example, in February 1983, the Ministry of 
Labor and Personnel issued a formal circular that called upon local governments to 
select pilot enterprises and industries to experiment with the replacement of the de 
facto system of job tenure with employment contracts.  In 1986, the State even 
required that all new workers be hired on fixed-term contracts with a maximum 
duration of four years.  In practice, however, laws and regulations at the state level 
were supplemented by local interpretation and were not enforced evenly.   
Some scholars have discussed the reasons for the introduction of the contract-
based system (Guthrie, 1998; White, 1987).  First, the State attempted to improve 
productivity and increase labor flexibility in state industries.  Unlike private 
businesses (both domestic and foreign invested) which have grown with essentially no 
financial support from the central government, state-owned enterprises relied heavily 
on government resources and therefore their operations were often plagued by the 
political goals of the government (Putterman & Dong, 2000; Steinfeld, 1988).  As the 
State decided to reduce the state-owned enterprises’ drain on government resources, it 
substantially increased managers’ autonomy in running state-owned enterprises and 
encouraged them to adopt productivity-enhancing measures.  The experiment with 
employment contracts for new recruits was one such productivity-enhancing measure.  
Other measures included performance-based pay, selective hiring procedures, use of 
disciplinary measures in the workplace, and the adoption of advanced production 
technologies (Gallagher, 2004; Warner, 1997).   
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Second, the Chinese government was confronted with the political urgency to 
alleviate tremendous unemployment pressures (Jefferson & Rawski, 1992).   The use 
of fixed-term contracts, as well as the spread of labor service companies (similar to 
temporary staffing agencies), was a way to diversify institutional channels of labor 
allocation and exchanges operating outside of the administrative network of state labor 
bureaus.  This allowed company managers to recruit their own workers and created 
more employment opportunities in domestic and foreign private companies.   
The final reason for introducing employment contracts entailed the protection 
of disadvantaged labor, especially in private enterprises (Warner, 1997).  The 
government saw labor contracts as a lawful instrument to regulate and protect migrant 
workers who were at the margin of the urban labor market and the national political 
arena.  The use of employment contracts makes an employer’s legal obligations clear 
and explicit.  In the presence of this coercive measure, employers are less likely to 
delay payment illegally and more likely to make due contribution to social securities 
and worker welfare.  In addition, the use of contracts set labor standards that are 
applicable to all workers based on contractual agreements, thereby reducing 
employment discrimination based on social economic status and administrative 
affiliation. 
In the beginning of these pilot steps, the introduction of the contract-based 
labor system was greeted with ambivalence and debate.  Scholars believed that the use 
of employment contracts would redistribute power among social strata and lead to a 
considerable change in the socio-economic position of China’s industrial workers and 
in their relations with managers (Guthrie, 1998; Walder, Li, & Treiman, 2000; White, 
1987).  Supporters argued that the new system opened up contractual options for both 
labor and management.  It legally recognizes and safeguards the freedom to choose 
one’s own job, the right to get paid for one’s labor and receive social insurance and 
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welfare and the right to rest days and holidays and a safe workplace (Tomba, 2002).  
Yet, deep disagreement among elite politicians and academics (especially 
conservatives who were skeptical of economic reforms), as well as the public’s 
anxiety about employment security and worker morale, had stalled the universalization 
of employment contracts for more than a decade (Gu, 1999).  It was not until 1993 that 
the government set a timetable for making employment contracts a mandatory 
component of the employment relationship for companies regardless of their 
ownership status.   
The Labor Law, which was passed in 1994 and became effective in 1995, 
formally requires that all employees sign employment contracts with their employers.  
The Labor Law consolidated the myriad of laws that had been passed during the 
previous decades.  As a national law, it stipulates the legal principles for contractual 
employment relations, elaborates a range of workers’ rights, and redefines the role of 
the state as regulator of labor relations (Frenkel & Kuruvilla, 2002).  In particular, it 
establishes a contract-based labor system, which requires a written employment 
contract between an employer and an employee.  This system provides three types of 
contracts: open-ended, fixed term, and assignment-based.  Open-ended contracts (or 
contracts without a fixed term) promise permanent employment except in rare cases.  
Firms are not required to use open-ended contracts unless both parties decide to renew 
the contract after a consecutive service of ten years.  Fixed-term contracts establish a 
legally binding employment relationship that lasts for a definite period of time.  Fixed-
term employment is widely used and has become a distinctive feature of the Chinese 
labor system.  Under a fixed-term contract, the employer or the employee can 
terminate the employment relationship unilaterally upon expiration of the contract, for 
good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.  The employer also can make severance 
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payments to discharge an employee before the ending date of the contract. 1  The third 
type, assignment-based contracts, refers to an employment contract that expires upon 
the completion of a certain job.  They are far less common, usually found among 
casual workers, especially in seasonal, low-skilled jobs in agriculture and construction 
sectors.   
In addition to the establishment of a contract-based system, the introduction of 
the Labor Law had important institutional implications.  First, the Labor Law governs 
all types of employment relationships; it eliminated previous distinctions among 
enterprises based on ownership arrangements – for example, state, collective, domestic 
private, joint venture, or wholly foreign.  Therefore, the Law provides at least in 
principle a unified regulatory framework for firms’ personnel activities.    
Second, the Labor Law emphasizes civil liability for contract breach as an 
incentive to comply with contractual obligations in place of administrative sanctions.  
This change was particularly important to state-owned enterprises (Lee, 1998).  State-
owned enterprises officially became independent legal entities, rather than as 
operating units of the government.  Therefore, the Law entitles state-owned enterprises 
and other companies to terminate employment relationships as specified in the 
contracts.  It also means that workers can change jobs without permission granted by 
the state-owned enterprises.  Instead, the state-owned enterprises have the right to sue 
the worker and/or the new employer for damages. 
 Finally, consistent with prior labor regulations, the Labor Law was very 
cautious in granting companies the autonomy to layoff and to dismiss workers.  
Instead, the Law tightened control of the termination process by requiring companies 
to report such decisions to administrative authorities (i.e., labor bureaus at different 
                                                 
1 Except for cases of disciplinary dismissals, severance payments amount to one month of pay for each 
year the employee has supplied service to the company (up to a maximum of 12 months). 
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levels).   Some scholars believe that these conservative provisions reflected the 
government’s continued commitment to job security for workers.  As stated in Article 
27, an employer can only lay off workers if it is experiencing severe financial stress, 
has received support from the trade union in the company, and has submitted a report 
to the labor authorities.   Workers cannot be laid off simply to improve productivity 
and efficiency.  Although the Law technically does not require approval for economic 
layoffs from the labor authorities, companies would be reluctant to undergo layoffs in 
the face of a stated objection by the authorities.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While almost all employment based on fixed-term contracts (the prevailing 
form of all employment contracts) is legally temporary because it is defined as a 
definite term contract, the dominant employment relationship is generally understood 
to be permanent, or more accurately, non-temporary.  Employers and employees 
expect that employment will continue as long as the business goes well and the 
employees work up to expectations.  Employers will have strong incentives to nurture 
a mutually obligatory relationship with employees and, after ten years of employment, 
offer permanent relationship as a reward for years of loyalty to the organization.  
However, recent years have witnessed the proliferation of temporary employment 
relationships, which are used to cover long-term personnel needs in regular positions, 
rather than on an ad hoc basis.  Temporary and permanent employees often have the 
same job duties, skill requirements, and performance objectives.  They are even 
organized into the same work groups under the same supervisor.  Evidence suggests 
that some companies strategically use a set of recurring short-term contracts to replace 
the stable, permanent employment relationships.  In this research, I define 
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management policies and actions that use a mix of permanent and temporary 
employees in regular positions as “alternative employment strategies.”  
Meanwhile, another important development in China during the same period of 
time is an increasing emphasis on the value of people.  Firms came to view the 
creativity, ingenuity, and problem-solving abilities of their employees as sources of 
competitive advantage in market competition.  Therefore, they began to design and 
adopt a coherent pattern of human resource practices that provide employees with 
skills, incentives, and responsibility to make decisions essential for production 
improvement, quality service, and rapid response to change.  While practitioners and 
researchers have substantially advanced our understanding of these new systems of 
human resources, it is not clear how these systems might interact with decisions to use 
temporary employment contracts or how they might jointly affect organizational 
performance.  
In order to tackle the fundamental questions about the relationships between  
the organizational and institutional contexts, employment practices, and organizational 
effectiveness, I identified three research questions for investigation in this dissertation: 
• How do managers’ perceptions of the organizational and institutional environment 
shape their adoption of temporary employment contracts?  
• What are the institutional and organizational factors that lead to the spread of 
temporary employment contracts? 
• What is relationship between alternative employment strategies, high involvement 
human resource practices, and organizational outcomes?  
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
 To explore the rise of temporary work in China, I chose call centers as the 
empirical setting because they are a site in which many conflicting economic and 
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institutional forces unfold.  Call centers are technology-mediated services and sales 
operations and have become the primary mechanism through which companies 
interact with their customers.  First, call center operations are of strategic importance 
because their employees span the organization-customer interface and they are critical 
to customer satisfaction and retention.  Therefore, organizations have strong incentives 
to develop and retain a group of qualified employees who can continuously improve 
service productivity and quality.  Second, call center technologies, such as automatic 
call distribution, scripting solutions, and electronic monitoring system, make the 
routinization of human interaction possible.  As a result, organizations depend more 
on the general skills of individual workers and have more autonomy in using 
temporary employment contracts to bring in new employees with little firm-specific 
human capital.  Third, the call center industry in China is new and fast-growing.  
Compared to many other industries, call centers have been operating in an open, 
competitive market, since their inception; and they have not been subject to severe 
labor regulations.  Also, the relatively short age of establishments implies that when 
designing employment practices, managers are rarely constrained by historical 
burdens such as overstaffing and organizational decline.  Finally, by focusing on one 
type of service work across multiple industries such as telecommunications, banking, 
and manufacturing, I am able to reduce confounding effects due to occupational 
heterogeneity while simultaneously allowing for sufficient variation in organizational 
and industrial characteristics.  It also makes possible the development of a more 
contextualized analysis on the part of the researcher.  
 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
To conduct this research, I carried out field work in three stages over a 16-
month period beginning in June 2006.  Phase I (June – Nov 2006) involved extensive 
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fieldwork to explore the business and institutional environments of call centers in 
several cities in China, including Beijing, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Suzhou, 
and Tianjin.  During this period, I collected a total of 23 face-to-face interviews; each 
of them taking 90 to 120 minutes.  Informants included general managers and HR 
managers in corporate offices, general managers and HR managers in call centers, 
customer service representatives, supervisors from temporary help agencies, and 
leaders of the professional association.  In all cases, I used a combination of structured 
and semi-structured conversations in order to obtain in-depth information, but at the 
same time to try to get behind the official line and find out how managers interpreted 
laws and implemented human resource practices.  I also used a pilot group of 
companies to pre-test the questionnaire designed for establishment surveys in Phase II.  
In addition to face-to-face interviews, I also collected advertising and informative and 
educational material from each of the companies and offices I visited.  The analysis of 
these documents not only allowed me to validate data, but also to shed light on the 
evolution that temporary employment contracts have developed in Chinese workplaces 
in the past years.  Interviews, observations, and archival analyses at this phase 
corroborated my expectation that a nrm’s decision about the use of temporary 
employment contracts is a result of the interplay of institutional pressures, market 
dynamics, and organizational attributes.  While some of these influences have been 
discussed in existing studies of developed countries, many factors are unique to the 
Chinese context.  My field experience also highlighted the importance of 
understanding the institutional context by which organizations are embedded.    
The major task during Phase II (Mar – July 2007) included collection of 
establishment-level surveys and regional/industrial archives.  The establishment-level 
surveys ask general managers in each call center to answer questions about 
organizational characteristics and the use of temporary employment contracts for 
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employees in the core job group.   The survey instrument was developed jointly by the 
global call center research network, was drafted in the English language and then 
translated into Chinese through the established back translation process.  I made 
necessary revisions to customize the instrument to the Chinese setting, based on 
information collected from the pilot study at Phase I.  Because no suitable sampling 
frame existed, I collected and compiled a list of call center names, as many as possible, 
from multiple sources.  In total, I collected a list of over 600 call center names.  At the 
same time, I visited call centers of different sizes and locations and talked to people 
who worked there.  
Then I contacted Call Center Magazine, a trade publication, and asked them 
for the contact information for call center managers in its subscriber database.  This 
Magazine is the most popular professional magazine for people who are interested in 
call center operations, including but not limited to call center managers.  I was able to 
match contact information for managers in 187 call centers.  I made phone calls to 
each of them and invited them to participate in the project; 137 managers agree to 
participate. In total 102 call centers returned surveys, for a response rate of 74%, or 
55% of the original 187.  This response rate is high because I developed personnel 
connection with business practitioners and the professional community when 
conducting the field work.   
In the final phase (July – October 2007), I conducted unstructured interviews 
to revalidate my initial observations from surveys and to further untangle the 
dynamics between regular workers, temporary workers, and managers in the 
workplace.  Based on the network that I developed during Phase I and II, I identified 
several informants who have in-depth understanding of the call center industry in 
China.  These informants included line managers, top managers in the corporate 
offices, and supervisors of temporary staffing agencies.  When data collected from 
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fieldwork appeared to be confusing or contradictory, these informants were able to 
explicate the richness and complexity of the institutional environment and 
organizational actions.  These interviews were very helpful for improving the 
credibility and validity of my arguments and findings in this research.  Moreover, I 
conducted 26 semi-structured phone interviews with managers and employees in a 
large call center.  The interviewees included the CEO, seven managers (including HR, 
finance, sales, IT, training and development, customer care, telemarketing, and 
collection), and nine supervisors and nine front-line service workers.  Although 
interviews conducted with this large call center were not reported in this research, they 
facilitated my understanding and conceptualization of employment experience and 
workplace dynamics in these contexts. 
 
THREE STUDIES AND THEIR FINDINGS 
My dissertation concerns employers’ strategies to manage the workplace 
through the use of alternative employment contracts.  It consists of three empirical 
studies.  The first two studies explicitly focus on why companies make use of 
temporary employment contracts.  The third examines how employers mix permanent 
and temporary employment contracts in the same establishment and in the same 
service activities, and what the performance results are of these different approaches. 
The first study is an exploratory, qualitative study that probes managers’ 
perceptions of the organizational environment and their interpretations of the use of 
temporary employment contracts.  Drawn upon more than forty-five face-to-face 
interviews, I propose three broad explanations for the adoption of temporary 
employment contracts.  First, the use of temporary work lowers labor costs and 
increases economic efficiency.  Second, it increases the power of managers and allows 
them to meet their personal interests when the organization’s goals are in conflict with 
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those of the managers.  Finally, companies adopt temporary employment contracts to 
strategically redistribute the risks between the employers and the employees and 
therefore hedge against uncertainties due to market competition and institutional 
changes.  The findings suggest that the spread of temporary employment contracts is 
not merely a cost minimization tactic to cope with fluctuation in labor demands; rather, 
it is a strategic response to capitalize on market opportunities, to maintain managerial 
power, and to overcome the adverse effects of environmental changes. 
In the second study, I examine the effects of labor market conditions, product 
market conditions, political conditions, and capital market conditions on the spread of 
temporary employment strategies.  Empirically, I focus on the proportion of temporary 
employers in the workplace and use quasi-likelihood estimation methods to test the 
hypotheses.  Results of 102 establishment-level surveys suggest the following findings.  
First, establishments tend to make greater use of temporary employment contracts 
when they have access to an adequate supply of skilled labor and when wage rates are 
high in the labor market.  Second, establishments that deliver services in multiple 
geographic markets are less likely to use temporary employment contracts because 
geographic diversification spreads business risks and reduces the need to 
accommodate varying labor demand.  Third, firms that are highly dependent on state 
resources tend to maintain the long-term employment tradition to manage their 
relationship with political agencies.  Nevertheless, in face of radical transformation, 
state-owned enterprises are adopting short-term labor contracts to move away from 
entrenched practices of life-long employment and overstaffing.  Finally, capital 
markets and equity investors have a significant impact on the ways firms manage 
human resources.  As driven by shareholder oriented values and a focus on short-term 
returns, publicly traded companies are more likely than non-listed companies to use 
temporary contracts.  Also, NYSE listed companies are more likely to adopt 
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temporary employment contracts than those listed on the NASDAQ and Chinese stock 
exchanges. 
The final study investigates the relationship between alternative employment 
strategies, high involvement HR practices, and organizational performance.  I 
conceptualize alternative employment strategies as four distinct modes in order to 
capture varied employee interpretations in relation to the relative mix of temporary 
employees.  Based on social exchange theory, I developed and tested three hypotheses.  
First, employment strategies that make grater use of temporary contracts have lower 
organizational performance because temporary workers are less attached to the 
employer.  Second, high involvement HR practices are likely to increase 
organizational performance because employees are competent and motivated to use 
their discretionary effort at work.  Finally, the adoption of high involvement HR 
practices moderates the relationship between alternative employment strategies and 
organizational performance.  Employees’ attitudes and behaviors are a contingent 
response to the benefits conferred by the employer.  Temporary employees expect less 
of their employers by virtue of their work status.  When the employer invests in them 
beyond expectation, they go above what is required of them.  Therefore, the negative 
relationship between alternative employment strategies and organizational 
performances is lower when the company uses high involvement HR practices.  
Results of 82 establishment-level surveys support these hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 2 
WHY EMPLOYERS USE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:  
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF  
TECHNOLOGY-MEDIATED SERVICE WORK 
 
Long-term employment relationships have been the cornerstone of 
employment systems in many industrial economies (Kalleberg, 2000).  Employees 
perform tasks at the premises of and under direction of the employer for an indefinite 
period of time.  Over time, the employer and the employees establish a mutually 
obligatory relationship in which the employer offers job security and opportunities for 
career advancement and the employees, in return, offer loyalty and effort.  The 
proliferation of temporary work in the past decades, however, has begun to undermine 
this well-established norm (Smith, 1997; Houseman, 2001).  
 Prior research has documented the increasing use of temporary employees in 
the United States (e.g., Gonos, 1997; Houseman, 2001; Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 
2000).  Despite important differences in workforce composition, labor market 
conditions, and regulatory systems, such a trend is also observed in the transitional 
economy of China (Dong, 2007; Zhou, 2007).  While some scholars have begun to 
report the scope and pattern of temporary employment in China, few studies have 
examined the factors that shape these decisions from the employer’s perspective.   
In this study, I use an exploratory, qualitative approach to probe manager’s 
perceptions of the organizational environment and their interpretations of employment 
practices.  Drawn upon more than forty-five face-to-face interviews, I propose three 
broad explanations for the adoption of temporary employment contracts.  First, the use 
of temporary work lowers labor costs and increases economic efficiency.  Second, it 
increases the power of managers and allows them to meet their personal interests when 
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the organization’s goals are in conflict with those of the managers.. Finally, companies 
adopt temporary employment contracts to strategically redistribute the risks between 
the employers and the employees and therefore hedge against uncertainties due to 
market competition and institutional changes.  The findings suggest that the spread of 
temporary employment contracts is not merely a cost minimization tactic to cope with 
fluctuation in labor demand; rather, it is a strategic response to capitalize on market 
opportunities, to maintain managerial autonomy, and to overcome the adverse effects 
of environmental changes.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The dominant explanations for the use of temporary work come from 
economic considerations, which suggest that an organization searches for and adopts 
the employment structure that minimizes cost and optimizes efficiency (Osterman, 
1984; Williamson, 1981).  For example, Masters and Miles (2002) maintain that 
organizations invest in internal governance structures to protect against opportunism 
and bounded rationality.  Accordingly, they discussed three important dimensions that 
are critical to make-or-by decisions, including specialized asset investments, uncertain 
performance measurement, and transaction frequency.  First, when a job requires 
highly firm-specific skills and knowledge, a company has to invest in employees to 
prepare them for various idiosyncrasies such as equipment, organizational procedures, 
and culture.  Workers also accumulate a substantial amount of tacit knowledge 
through day-to-day practice.  To ensure an adequate return on investment, the 
company may utilize the internal governance structure and long-term, direct labor 
contract to stabilize employment.  Such a practice not only attaches skilled employees 
to the firm, but also facilitates knowledge sharing among workers and effectively 
aligns individual incentives with organizational performance (Doeringer & Piore, 
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1971; Osterman, 1984).  Second, performance uncertainty concerns whether the 
productivity of human assets can be easily monitored and evaluated (Williamson, 
1981).  When individual productivity is difficult to assess, long-term labor contracts 
offer an advantage over market purchasing by aligning employees with the employer’s 
interest, thus minimizing shirking and opportunistic behaviors (Williamson, 1981).  
Third, transaction frequency is relevant because market transactions incur costs when 
the employer negotiates, writes, and enforces a series of recurring contracts. Therefore, 
companies have an incentive to use internal employment structure when the position 
lasts for a long time.  However, permanent employment relationships require 
substantial investment in hierarchical governance, such as building job ladders and 
administration resources; and an organization has to bear considerable exist costs in 
the event of workforce reductions.  When the benefits of exchanging labor in the 
market outweigh the costs, the organization may capitalize on temporary employment 
contracts to enhance economic efficiency.  Accordingly, the economic literature has 
suggested that organizations use temporary workers when product demands are 
seasonal, cyclical, or diminishing (Abraham & Taylor, 1996; Gramm & Schnell, 2001; 
Mangum, Mayall, & Nelson, 1985).  In particular, employers are likely to externalize 
employment in work activities that are separable from the core workflow (Kalleberg & 
Marsden, 2005).  In these studies, temporary positions are generally portrayed as low 
skill, low pay, and offer few career prospects; temporary workers are viewed as less 
valuable and even marginal to the organization.   
An alternative perspective interprets employment contracts from the view of 
power struggles and organizational politics.  As an organization evolves over time, it 
develops norms and expectations about output, promotion procedures, and control 
measures (Scott, 1995).  Managerial decisions concerning the nature of employment 
contracts are the outcomes of social and political processes within organizations 
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(Osterman, 1984).  Under these circumstances, managers are driven by self-interest or 
personal ideology to retain certain powers or structures that bear little direct 
relationship to productivity.  For example, in a study of part-time work, Appelbaum 
and Firpo (2003) argued that the use of headcount as a rule of thumb to track labor 
costs reflects the power imbalance between finance managers and line managers.  The 
authors found that finance managers, who generally do not trust line managers to hold 
the line on labor costs, favor the use of headcount measures because of their presumed 
clarity and simplicity.  The persistence of the headcount measure, despite its inability 
to accommodate contemporary business needs, represents a compromise between 
political struggles among different departments and levels within the company.  In a 
recent study of highly skilled workers, Bidwell (2009) argues that when organizational 
goals are in conflict with managers’ interests, managers have incentives to use 
temporary workers to increase their autonomy. 
This study draws upon these perspectives to explore the spread of temporary 
employment contracts in China.  Excerpts from two cases in the study are presented.  
CNT is the largest wireline telecommunications and broadband services provider in 
China, owning 70% of the national trunk-line transmission network assets.  It provides 
a range of telecommunications services to residential and business customers, 
including local, domestic and international long distance telephone services, Internet 
and managed data, leased-line and other related services.  Although the company is 
listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, a predominant majority of 
shares are held by the state.  Its call centers,  “Hotline 10000”, are the major point of 
customer contact, offering directory assistance, handling customer inquiries and 
complaints, and responding to repair calls.  Hotline 10000 also runs sales and 
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marketing operations.  It handled 26.7% of total subscriptions in 20072.   The human 
resource manager of Hotline 10000 in a major southern city described their uses of 
different employment contracts.  
“This center houses four types of individuals who hold customer service 
representative jobs.  The first type includes about 200 employees who are in an 
approved headcount “regular” employment position (Zheng Shi Bian Zhi).  The 
second type consists of 700 workers hired on temporary contracts.  Some of these 
temporary workers have been working here for three years.  Third, at business 
peaks, staff from a labor supplier pitch in on a day-to-day basis. Finally, about 10 
individuals were sent from the local Employment Assistance Program to prepare 
for employment; they get paid from the Program.” 
 “China Telecom assigns and supervises these workers but the agencies 
carry out general payroll administration services. The company treats these first 
two types of workers the same in assigning and scheduling jobs, evaluating 
performance, and even setting starting salaries; but temps receive far fewer 
benefits.  They have equal promotion opportunities, except for a few key 
positions.”   
Another example is the customer contact center that supports the home 
appliances business of LGE, a foreign manufacturing company.  The center handles 
three types of calls.  First, it responds to customer service inquires and provides 
technical  support over the phone.  Second, the center receives repair requests and 
distributes the requests to over 2500 local service stations.  Finally, it makes “Happy 
Calls”, which ask existing customers to complete a customer satisfaction survey in 
order to improve products and services.  
                                                 
2 See China Telecom, 2007 Annual report (pp. 21). http://www.chinatelecom-
h.com/eng/ir/reports/annual2007.htm  
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“Initially, we staffed this call center with about 30 agents. At that time, we 
used a placement service company as a recruitment channel.  All thirty agents 
were permanent employees of LGE. We quickly realized that we needed more 
people to handle calls.  A debate raged in the corporate office concerning whether 
to keep the call center operation in house. Finally, upper-level management 
decided to pay a fee and ask the placement service company to carry the payroll of 
new employees.  Since then, we have recruited forty agents as agency 
temporaries.”  
“Although the agency dispenses monthly paychecks, LGE sets the wage 
rates and benefits of agency workers to make sure that they get the same as 
permanent employees.  We also pay the placement service company so that agency 
workers receive the same meal subsidies and holiday gifts. In addition, all 
employees have access to various facilities and activities in the larger corporate 
community.  Obviously, these benefits are not required by the placement service 
company or covered in the service contract.  Not all receiving firms are so 
generous.  We do so because we are committed to providing a fair and favorable 
working environment for all employees.” 
In both examples, temporary work has become increasingly integrated into the 
human resource practices of the primary firms.  Temporary and permanent employees 
often have the same job duties, skill requirements, and performance objectives.  They 
are even organized in the same work groups under the same supervisor.  Evidence 
suggests that some companies strategically use a set of recurring short-term contracts 
to replace the stable, permanent employment relationships in order to increase labor 
flexibility, reduce costs, and avoid obligations.  An analysis of how organizations are 
incorporating temporary work will illuminiate the factors that affect organizational 
decisions and practices during China’s economic transition.  
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METHODS 
 This study was conducted over the period between June 2006 and October 
2007.  During this time period, general labor laws, rather than specific rules and 
legislations, loosely covered employers’ use of temporary employment contracts.  In 
other words, laws allowed for managerial autonomy and therefore substantial 
variations in the use of alternative forms of employment contracts.   
 I approached the China Call Center Association for assistance in soliciting 
participation from member organizations.  For those companies that showed interest in 
participating in my research, I telephoned the managers, introduced myself as a 
university researcher investigating management activities in call centers, and 
scheduled a time to visit their offices on site.  The goal of the interviews was to elicit 
information about employers’ perceptions and interpretations of the use of temporary 
employment contracts.  I was able to conduct forty-five interviews with general and 
HR managers in call centers (See Appendix 1.1 for details).  The respondents talked 
about general issues in their daily operations (e.g., product and service offerings, 
customer characteristics, business and regulatory environment, etc.) and the challenges 
that they were facing.  They also provided specific accounts on personnel issues (e.g., 
training, compensation, and promotion) and decisions about the nature of employment 
contracts.  In addition to interviews with call center managers, I conducted interviews 
with general managers and HR managers at corporate offices, representatives of 
temporary help agencies, and industry experts.  These interviews are useful to 
understand decision making at different organizational levels, to expand on the detail 
and background on the topic, and to verify information.  In all interviews, I used an 
open-ended format to encourage the respondents to explain their decision making 
processes as much as they wished and in a manner that they wished.  While I was 
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guiding the interview, a trained graduate student in a local university took notes and 
asked occasional clarifying questions.  A typical interview lasted two hours, with 
some lasting as long as five hours when managers desired to share more of their 
experiences and insights.  In addition to interviews, I used written instruments and 
collected printed material to gather supplemental information on management 
practices and operations in these call centers.  Throughout the study, I, as well as a 
graduate research assistant, documented observations and interviews in field notes, 
research diaries, and summaries.  Quotations in the following sections of this paper 
were based on transcripts of taped conversations and written notes when interviews 
were not taped (often at the request of the respondents). 
 This study followed the established procedures for theory-building inductive 
research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003).  I analyzed field notes at two levels.  First, I 
focused on building detailed descriptions of factors that motivated or inhibited 
managers to make use of temporary employment contracts.  I treated these factors as 
separate cases.  Next I examined these cases and coded them according to a variety of 
simple typologies that emerged during the process.  I then sorted individual cases by 
center, documented patterns in the data, constructed tentative theoretical explanations, 
and applied them to explain regularities in the data.   
 
FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS 
The key question driving this research was, how do managers’ perceptions of 
the organizational and institutional environment shape the adoption of temporary 
employment contracts?  Analysis of field interviews suggests that the development 
and structure of employment practices must be understood in terms of a firm’s cost-
benefit calculations, concordance with organizational decision-making and politics, 
and responses to uncertainties arising from the external environment.  I organized 
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company responses into three major themes.  First, employers may use agency 
workers to reduce labor costs and save administrative resources, in order to achieve 
economic efficiency.  Second, even when hiring agency temporaries is not 
economically justifiable, managers choose to do so in order to increase power and 
cope with organizational politics.  Finally, firms shift risks to temporary employees 
and shirk social obligations in order to limit their exposure to future uncertainties.   
 
Economic Considerations 
The first finding supports economic arguments regarding how and why 
employers make employment decisions (Osterman, 1984; Williamson, 1981).  The use 
of temporary employment contracts provides an economically viable option of 
acquiring and maintaining labor (Houseman, 2001).  Temporary employees are 
generally associated with lower wages and benefits.  Based on a survey of 71 call 
centers in this study, the average monthly pay for agency employees was RMB 1,832, 
while regular employees earned more than RMB 2,200.  This difference is statistically 
significant.  Moreover, 23 out of 34 companies that used short-term contracts reported 
that lowering salary and benefits for temporary workers is an important reason to use 
temporary workers.  As a manager in a supporting center of an IT manufacturer said: 
“We are operating in a highly competitive environment.  Cutting costs is always a 
priority.”  
The use of temporary employment contracts provides firms with a convenient 
way to create a differentiated pay structure.  Employers have incentives to offer 
above-market wages only to some employees whose skills are critical to business 
performance, who have high levels of firm-specific human capital, and whose 
performance is difficult to monitor; but differential treatment in wage and benefits to 
employees in the same organization may be limited by labor laws and regulations. A 
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manager in a commercial bank took the Housing Provident Fund as an example.  The 
program is similar to 401(k) or IRA retirement programs in the United State for the 
specific purpose of home purchase.  The employer contributes as low as 5% or as high 
as 12% of an employee’s actual salary to the fund.  She said: “Banks are in a talent 
war for branch managers and financial specialists. They are hot on the market. To 
keep these people, the bank has to offer attractive wages and benefits.” Therefore, the 
bank intended to raise the contribution for managerial and professional employees to 
the maximum (i.e., 12%) while keeping the rate for frontline employees low (i.e., 5%).  
The local labor bureau did not approve this request and insisted that the company 
choose a flat rate for all employees.  To save costs, the bank put new hires on the 
agency’s payroll and asked the agency to pay a lower contribution to the Fund.  
In the case of temporary agency employment, firms also may save 
administrative resources with the aid of specialized staffing agencies.  In small 
companies or branches without independent HR departments, general managers who 
are responsible for revenue generation have to supervise many HR activities such as 
hiring and firing.  Staffing agencies provide an efficient alternative to reduce this extra 
workload for general managers.  Staffing agencies are often rooted in the local labor 
market and continuously collect information from both the employer and the 
employees.  Over time, they accumulate extensive knowledge about particular 
occupational groups and develop networks to sort job seekers into matched positions 
(Benner, 2003).  When certain types of skill are in high demand, the agencies may 
channel this information to job seekers and even provide basic training.  This 
considerably shortens the process of searching and hiring for client firms.  As a 
manager in the customer support center of a manufacturing MNC explained:  
“Many job applicants don’t have a realistic picture of what customer 
service representatives do… many of them quit within two weeks after completion 
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of initial training.  It is a big waste of our time and money.  Hiring a temporary 
help agency can save money because the agency brings in workers who have skills 
and who know the working conditions well.”   
In addition to face-to-face interviews, I obtained samples of service contracts 
from staffing agencies.  These contracts clearly specify the agency’s joint 
responsibilities in maintaining a qualified, stable pool of employees: if an agency 
employee quits, the agency must refill this opening within twenty days. Moreover, if 
more than one third of total agency workers leave within a quarter, the agency has to 
pay a penalty fee.  These provisions are especially beneficial to call centers as turnover 
rates are typically 30-35% per year.   
Under China’s Tax Code, firms may use temporary employment contracts to 
lower labor costs through tax arbitrage.  Tax arbitrage refers to business activities that 
take advantage of a difference in tax rates or tax systems as the basis for profit.  For 
example, payroll expenses are only partially deductible, while service purchase from a 
third party, such as a temporary help agency, is considered a tax-deductible business 
expense.  Therefore, firms have incentives to engage in tax arbitrage by hiring 
temporary agency workers.  Let us consider two companies, A and its competitor, B.  
Company A directly hires employees and is the employer of record.  It can take 
advantage of RMB 960 per employee each month as non-taxable payroll expenses.  
Any payroll expenditure exceeding that is considered taxable and is subjected to a 
corporate revenue tax rate at 33%.  By contrast, Company B, which hires employees 
from a staffing agency, pays a lump sum of non-taxable service fees to cover the 
salaries, bonuses, commissions and mandatory payments associated with the use of 
agency workers.  As a result, Company B legally shields some of its taxable payroll 
costs by hiring a temporary help agency. 
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Politics and Managerial Power 
The second finding identifies how the use of temporary employment contracts 
is the outcome of social processes and power struggles within organizations.  
Interviews with managers at different hierarchical levels revealed how conflicts of 
interests arise as different organizational sub-units pursue their own goals, which in 
turn influences the use of employment contracts.  
Line managers have incentives to use temporary employment contracts 
because they have more control over temporary workers than over regular workers.  
Prior research has suggested that organizations established structured employment 
practices, such as the development of internal market rules, to curb the power of line 
managers on personnel activities such as hiring, rewarding, and dismissing workers 
(Cappelli, 2000; Jacoby, 1985).  A component of formal employment structures entails 
the measure of “headcount”, or the number of employees that a company carries on its 
payroll.  It is an essential part of corporate-wide resource planning.  Companies that 
use headcount for this purpose typically allot divisional and line managers a fixed 
headcount, or number of employees, to accomplish the work of their departments.  
Because the number of temporary employees is not included in headcount restrictions, 
line managers may expand their authority by expanding the proportion of temporary 
employees in the workplace.  
I asked line managers the reasons for evading headcount restrictions rather 
than seeking to change them.  Some managers explained the difficulties of getting an 
“off-cycle” headcount change.  A company’s current budget cycle may include two 
formal budget adjustment periods: new-year budget development and mid-year budget 
adjustments.  These are critical points in the budgeting and planning process because 
they provide opportunities for the company to evaluate and allocate resources and they 
require substantial coordination and collaboration between different departments, 
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including human resources, accounting, and marketing.  To increase headcount, a line 
manager must prepare the necessary paperwork to identify and justify the need for a 
new position.  An extensive review process requires at least a corporate officer or a 
regional director for that position to approve the request.  In some companies that I 
interviewed, off-cycle budget changes are limited to emergencies and to the support of 
critical corporate priorities.  Therefore, off-cycle changes in headcount require a 
substantial amount of managerial time and political skills.  Hiring employees on short-
term contracts provides a viable alternative because the corporate HR offices do not 
handle the hiring and firing of temporary workers.  A line manager in an IT 
manufacturer said: “My boss is very open-minded to the idea of hiring temps because 
he doesn’t need to call his bosses to report such matters.  He makes it very clear: If 
you can stick to the P& L that you’ve set, you’ve got my support.”  
Head count is more than a mere tracking of numbers (i.e., workforce size and 
labor costs); it sometimes implies an organization’s decision to make a change.  For 
example, in order to increase labor efficiency, a company may push line managers to 
increase overall output while diminishing headcount.  The expectation is that line 
managers will substantially change the way that work is organized and may even 
redefine what that work is.  This is why headcount restrictions are often the result of 
restructuring efforts such as increasing automation, eliminating redundant functions, 
merging units, using self-managing teams, expanding span of supervisory control, and 
flattening hierarchical levels.  When bringing additional workers on board on a 
temporary basis, however, line managers may disguise the fact that they did not or did 
not intend to implement structural changes.  In these cases, managers consciously 
obey formal, visible requirements of headcount limits in order to disguise the fact that 
they have not made substantial changes that were anticipated by or imposed from the 
top.   
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           In addition to line managers who seek for more flexibility of and control over 
human resource policies, managers in finance departments also have strong incentives 
to use temporary employees, which gives the illusion of improved financial 
performance.  When companies turn to stock or bond markets for finance, they are 
exposed to harsh evaluation regarding their financial performance.  A common 
observation in the U.S. is that individual and institutional investors place increasing 
pressure on boards to make short-term decisions in order to reduce costs and boost 
profits, which is supposed to lead to higher stock prices.  This short-term investment 
orientation puts pressure on the finance department to ensure that the company’s 
performance measures, including revenue per labor input, live up to the expectations 
of security analysts and equity investors.  To accomplish this goal, companies can 
either increase revenue with the same labor input or maintain revenue with lower labor 
input.  Finance managers, who are powerful in organization decisions, tend to adopt 
the latter approach because they are skeptical of line managers’ ability to increase 
revenue.  Under these circumstances, line managers have to cut staff or replace 
permanent staff with temporary workers who do not show up in the payroll.  Often, 
line mangers hire temporary employees and use accounting rules to manipulate their 
performance metrics so that they look better than they actually are.  As a manager in a 
telecommunications company expressed:   
“If jobs of regular employees are refilled by temporary workers, 
expenditure goes into a different column.  That is, labor costs of temporary 
workers do not showing as payroll-related costs… Using temporary workers is a 
way to get things done without showing heads.  We appear to be more productive 
on financial reports.” 
Finally, state-owned enterprises may use temporary employment to evade the 
pay limits imposed on corporate managers by the government.  This finding is 
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consistent with prior research that managerial compensation schemes lead to political 
actions that may bear little relationship with economic performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Turk, & Tyler, 1989).  Corporate executives in state-owned enterprises have 
considerably increased their earnings since the adoption of performance-based 
compensation in the 1990s.  The supervision commissions of state-owned enterprises 
at national and provincial levels used several measures in command and control 
fashion to curb the widening salary gap within organizations.  For example, the 
commission in Beijing requires that total annual income of the CEO not exceed twelve 
times the average income in the company.  Also, the commission will send out a 
warning if labor costs of managerial employees exceed a reasonable proportion of 
total payroll expenses.  Among state-owned enterprises in Shanghai, the average pay 
raise among managerial employees was 23.9% between 2002 to 2006, while frontline 
employees only received an increase of 6.5% in that period.  As a result, in 2008, the 
supervising agency decided to include annual pay raises of frontline employees as a 
key item in the performance reviews of state-owned enterprises in Shanghai.  For 
these reasons, top management in corporate offices has a strong incentive to 
externalize some relatively low-paid positions while keeping the high-paid workforce 
on the books.  This effectively reduces the ratio of management to worker pay within 
the organization while the actual ratio for all employees actually working at the 
organization is higher.  
Clearly, managers make use of temporary employment contracts for personal 
gain and political legitimacy, despite the fact that such practices impose costs that are 
unaccounted for when companies rely on headcount to control labor costs.  
Specifically, line managers use temporary employees to increase their authority and 
control in the workplace.  Finance managers seek to boost labor productivity and 
enhance a firm’s financial performance for the evaluation of investors.  Finally, 
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corporate managers embrace or even induce temporary employment in order to raise 
their own pay beyond what is legally allowed.  
 
Uncertainties of the External Environment 
Although human assets are valuable resources to achieve competitive 
advantage, they entail inherent risks and uncertainties (Bhattacharya & Wright, 2005).  
Furthermore, the radical and sometimes disruptive changes during societal 
transformation in China gave rise to significant market and institutional uncertainties.  
Therefore, the use of temporary employment contracts has allowed firms to 
strategically redistribute risks between the employer and the employees, and hedge 
against unfavorable uncertainties in the future. 
Drawing upon real options theory, Bhattacharya and Wright (2005) explained 
that uncertainties associated with human resources arise from uncertainties in returns, 
volume and combination, and costs.  Uncertainty in returns arises from the 
unpredictability of the future value of human resources or the cash flow they generate.  
Uncertainties in volume and combination include varying labor demand that may 
fluctuate with market conditions and unexpected demand for skills that employees do 
not possess.  Finally, uncertainty in costs refers to the resources that a firm has to 
invest in order to acquire and develop qualified employees.  Foote and Folta (1992) 
emphasized the irreversibility of investment decisions on human resources, as a result 
of labor market rigidities, implicit contracts between the employer and the employees, 
and social norms.  The authors also argued that companies can use temporary 
employees to minimize uncertainties and maximize flexibility.   
Discussions of the uncertainties inherent in managing human resources are 
particularly relevant to the Chinese context.  Many scholars question the sustainability 
of China’s economic development.  Economic and social problems range from bad 
  32
loans in the banking system to an under-funded pension insurance scheme, the lack of 
a rural health care system, and bankrupt local governments.  The uncertainty and 
instability that characterizes a firm’s external environment has reduced the 
effectiveness of traditional investment decisions that are inadequate to anticipate and 
deal with such changes with requisite accuracy.  Under such conditions, 
management’s ability to operate with flexibility in its investment decisions brings 
more value to the firm.  From a real options perspective, investments with built-in 
flexibility provide more than one option for future courses of action to the firm 
(McGrath, Ferrier, & Mendelow, 2004).  As future conditions unfold, managers can 
choose the most appropriate course of action in order to adapt to emergent new 
circumstances.   Some of the managers that I interviewed worked in extremely 
profitable companies because of their monopoly market power.  For them, hiring 
people on a temporary basis provides a way to acquire human resources with built-in 
flexibility to accommodate market and institutional uncertainties, such as changes of 
regulatory structures and the deregulation of state industries.  As a manager from a 
mobile telecommunications said:  
“We did not use temps to save money.  It is secondary.  What we care about 
are the long-term prospects of the company.  People start working here in their 
early twenties.  But who knows what will happen to our company or these workers 
ten years later? We don’t know and we cannot take a risk of keeping these workers 
forever or firing a tenured regular worker.  We must retain an exit strategy.”  
Another type of uncertainty comes from the inadequacy of the current labor 
legislation framework, or the liability associated with dismissals in particular.  The 
influences of political institutions, including pressure from the government and laws, 
are highly complex in a transitional economy like China.  Many managers noted that, 
as policy makers are experimenting with alternative regulatory approaches in order to 
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construct effective labor protection and enforcement strategies, they worried that the 
government will institute a more sophisticated and rigid labor regulatory system in the 
near future.  Hence, some employers have withdrawn their commitment to workers by 
hiring them on a limited-term basis or placing them under the payroll of a different 
business unit.  One manager in a state-owned enterprise airline company reported the 
use of an “in-house” temporary agency, which is wholly owned and managed by the 
airline.  All employees who were recruited after 2002 (including all sales agents in the 
ticketing center) were placed on the payroll of this agency.  Since this agency is an 
independent accounting unit that signs labor contracts with employees, legal 
obligations are absorbed by the agency, rather than the airline company.  The manager 
said: “Our company is not obligated to any promises to them (temporary employees) 
because they are not our employees.” Many other respondents also indicated that their 
companies followed a “zero-growth” plan for regular employees because they “could 
not” take on more responsibilities and obligations.  One HR manager mentioned that 
the company only recruited 1,400 regular employees from the labor market in 2006 
(retirements and quits not included), while it had a total of over 280,000 employees.  
In fact, the manager reported in the survey that 95% of all service employees in call 
centers were on temporary contracts. 
 
SUMMARY 
This study explored the motivations that drive Chinese employers to use 
temporary employment contracts in interactive service work.  Research on the 
economic transition in China has shown that as government control declines and 
markets develop, the conditions and incentives that managers encounter have changed 
dramatically (Frenkel & Kuruvilla, 2002).  Managers have to face pressures from 
market competition, political contests within the organization, and uncertainties in the 
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political and economic environment.  Field interviews and survey data suggest three 
important findings.  First, employers use temporary workers to reduce labor costs and 
achieve economic efficiency.  This finding is consistent with most discussions of 
temporary work in industrial economies (e.g., Houseman, 2001; Masters & Miles, 
2002).  To reduce costs, management has a strong incentive to decrease the number of 
in-house, permanent employees.  How far one can go along these lines may rest upon 
the supply of willing temporary temployees and the possible adverse cost impacts.  
For firms that face a heightened level of market competition, cost considerations are 
imperative.  
Even when the use of temporary employment contracts is not economically 
justifiable, managers may choose to do so to advance their own personal interests.  I 
found that headcount limits within companies drive the widespread use of labor 
employed on a temporary basis.  Line managers use temporary employees to increase 
their authority and control in the workplace.  Finance managers seek to boost the 
company’s financial performance to the expectations of investors.  Finally, corporate 
managers favor temporary employment in order to raise their wages while technically 
complying with rules that restrict the pay gap between the highest and lowest paid 
employees.  
Finally, Chinese managers are increasingly concerned with long-term security 
and strategic outlook for their companies (Nee, 1992).  This study suggests managers 
feel a high level of uncertainty due to market competition and institutional 
transformations.  Hence, companies shift some employers’ obligations to temporary 
help agencies, so that they are better able to hedge against future uncertainties that 
may arise from markets or institutional changes.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICTORS 
OF THE ADOPTION OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
 
In recent decades there has been a growing interest in how employment 
systems evolve in an environment of increasing competitive pressure and market 
unpredictability.  A major trend has been the replacement of long-term, career-
oriented employment with short-term contracting (Houseman, 2001; Kalleberg, 2000).  
The most common explanations focus primarily on reducing labor costs and achieving 
flexibility in adjusting to temporal changes in staffing demands (Abraham & Taylor, 
1996; Mangum, Mayall, & Nelson, 1985).  However, recent evidence suggests that an 
increasing number of firms deliberately assign temporary workers to business 
activities that are critical to organizational value creation (e.g., Lautsch, 2002; Masters 
& Miles, 2002; Olsen, 2006).  These developments indicate that a narrow focus on 
efficiency cannot adequately explain organizational motives in designing employment 
contracts, especially motives that operate outside of rational economic calculations. 
The spread of temporary employment contracts represent a divergent 
organizational change that operates in a contested terrain (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Sanders 
& Tuschke, 2007).  While some actors support its legitimacy, many powerful actors in 
the primary institutional environment, such as government as well as the public at 
large, oppose it.  Understanding alternative forms of employment contracts is 
important both for understanding the change of employment relations and for 
advancing management research.  Organizational scholars have primarily focused on 
the successful reproduction of socially favorable organizational practices, and 
emphasized processes of conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  Only a 
limited number of studies have examined variety in organizational practices within 
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institutional contexts and have examined the heterogeneous, even sometimes 
conflicting, expectations and demands imposed by external interest groups on 
organizational practices (e.g., D’Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 1991; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Sanders & Tuschke, 2007).   This study adds to this emerging body of literature by 
investigating the fragmented and contested nature of the organizational environment 
and its influences on the use of temporary employment contracts. 
In this study, I examine why companies adopt temporary employment 
contracts in response to pressures from labor and product markets, political agents, 
and finance providers.  Drawing upon perspectives from transaction costs and resource 
dependency theories, I argue that multiple forms of rationality influence employers’ 
decisions regarding their use of alternative employment contracts, as organizations 
rely on exchange relationships with external agents with distinct values and goals.  I 
develop a set of theoretically driven arguments to examine the influences of labor 
market conditions, product market conditions, political conditions, and capital market 
conditions on the spread of temporary employment contracts.  I chose technology-
mediated service centers that operated in mainland China as the empirical setting.   
 
THEORY 
I draw upon two prominent theoretical perspectives in this research, the 
transaction costs and resource dependency perspectives, to conceptualize managerial 
decisions about their use of employment contracts.  Although these two perspectives 
view the underlying mechanisms of decision making in distinctive ways, they are not 
inherently contradictory.  This study attempts to integrate these perspectives to explain 
why firms adopt alternative approaches to employment contracts.   
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Transaction Costs Theory 
Transaction costs theory posits that organizations search for and adopt the 
employment structure that minimizes cost and optimizes efficiency (Williamson, 
1981).   In this view, long-term employment contracts are efficient because firms are 
able to benefit from the investments in a qualified and committed workforce and 
reduce costs associated with employee turnover (Althauser, 1989; Doeringer & Piore, 
1971; Osterman, 1984).  First, firms have to devote considerable time and 
administrative resources to recruit and select qualified job candidates for given 
positions.  Moreover, firms need to invest in specific training in order to prepare new 
employees for various on-the-job idiosyncrasies such as equipment, procedure, and 
culture.  Finally, a long-term orientation implicit in the internal employment 
arrangement effectively aligns employee interests with the employer’s goal, thus 
minimizing adverse consequences of shirking and opportunism.  Therefore, long-term 
employment relationships represent a more efficient option than short-term contracts 
to acquire human capital, especially when companies face tight labor markets, require 
substantial firm-specific skills, and have difficulty monitoring employee efforts and 
performance (Masters & Miles, 2002).   
However, temporary employment is usually associated with some forms of 
labor cost savings, particularly in regard to fringe benefits costs (Houseman, 2001), 
although this benefit depends on the specific rules found in national employment laws.  
Prior research has suggested that firms may lower labor costs by replacing permanent 
employees with temporary workers, especially in activities that are peripheral to main 
value creation (Kalleberg & Marsden, 2005).  Moreover, the use of temporary 
employment contracts enhances a firm’s flexibility in adjusting staffing levels to 
market changes.  Previous empirical studies have found that temporary employment 
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arrangements are more pervasive in industries associated with high seasonality and 
cyclicality in production demand (Abraham & Taylor, 1996).  
 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Another prevailing theoretical approach to understanding employment 
structures comes from resource dependence theory.  Scholars posit that organizations 
are embedded in a web of exchange relationships from which they gain access to 
resources that are critical to survival prospects (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).   Different 
from institutional theories that emphasize conformity and isomorphism, the resource 
dependence perspective theorizes that firms, as agents of exchange, actively cope with 
the multiplicity and heterogeneity of powerful constituents in the organizational 
environment.   
Organizational decisions about employment contracts, from this perspective, 
reflect efforts to manage uncertainty and dependence on outside agents who can 
exercise control over critical resources.  Several studies have shown that firms adopt 
employment practices that conform to the interests of external groups, as a way to 
maintain legitimacy and stability.  Scholars have given particular attention to the 
influences of government and unions.  Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings (1986) traced the 
rise of modern personnel systems and found that government interventions fueled the 
development of bureaucratic controls by creating models of employment and 
incentives to formalize and expand personnel functions.  Similarly, Davis-Blake and 
Uzzi (1993) showed that government oversight of employment curbed the use of 
temporary workers.  On the roles of unions, Jacoby (1985) maintained that internal 
labor markets emerged as employers responded to union power.  During periods of 
tight labor markets and presence of union power, firms established internal labor 
markets -- including such practices as career ladders, job security, and seniority-based 
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pay -- to stabilize employment and realize economic benefits of firm specific skills.  In 
this way, unions promoted formal processes and facilitated the establishment of long-
term employment relationships.  Consistent with these predictions, empirical research 
found that the presence of unions was negatively related to the use of temporary 
workers (Abraham & Taylor, 1990; Uzzi & Barness, 1998). 
 
An Integration of the Two Perspectives 
Although perspectives of transaction costs and resource dependency operate 
under different theoretical assumptions, scholars have increasingly called for an 
integration to increase their explanatory power.   On the one hand, some scholars have 
challenged the overly narrow focus of the efficiency imperative in transaction costs 
arguments.  They have argued that previous studies have focused primarily on the 
economic and technical efficacy of temporary work, such as characteristics of the job 
incumbents being externalized, to the relative neglect of how a firm’s decision is 
fundamentally intertwined with broader organizational and institutional dynamics.  
Recent empirical work has shown that an organization’s characteristics and position in 
the environment socially define the rationality of organizational decisions (Lounsbury, 
2007).    
 On the other hand, scholars argue that resource dependency theorists can 
benefit from an integrated perspective by recognizing organizations’ willful, adaptive 
action in coping with complex exchange relationships.  Earlier literature has 
emphasized an unduly deterministic view of external influences, which allowed little 
scope for managerial judgment and autonomy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Also, 
previous research tends to assume system coherence or an overarching mission 
imposed by different actors within each country, thereby downplaying conflicts of 
goals and interests among these actors (Amable, 2000; Aoki, 1994; Hall & Soskice, 
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2001).  An integrated view emphasizes that managers are active participants in 
resource exchanges rather than passive recipients of external pressures.  Moreover, it 
encourages us to examine a boarder range of competing market and institutional forces 
within systems, and to investigate how managers strategically cope with the 
multiplicity nature of these forces (Oliver, 1991). 
In this endeavor, I develop hypotheses to examine how companies adopt 
temporary employment contracts in the face of varying pressures from labor and 
product markets, government, and capital market investors.  Managerial strategic 
choice (Child, 1972; Kochan, Katz, & McKersie, 1986), as influenced by the 
economic, political, and financial imperatives, is central to my theoretical arguments.  
As will be further discussed, such a conceptualization redirects the study of temporary 
employment as an ad hoc means to reduce labor variability and minimize labor costs 
toward a more fine-grained analysis of employment contracts as a strategic response to 
environmental contradiction and multiplicity.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
Labor Market Conditions  
As firms seek to increase efficiency and reduce uncertainty, they may establish 
permanent employment relationships to stabilize interactions with the labor market 
(Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1981).  In this study, I examine two dimensions of 
labor market conditions, stock and price of available human capital.  When the labor 
market is tight, firms are at a disadvantage in negotiating contracts with workers.  
Employers and employees are more likely to reach agreements about contract 
conditions -- such as job security -- in favor of the employees.  Moreover, the pressure 
that labor shortage puts on many aspects of business operations can be a significant 
burden, especially when companies have made substantial fixed asset investments 
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(such as work technologies in the study setting).  In this case, companies have strong 
incentives to provide long-term employment in order to secure a stable flow of skilled 
labor (Osterman, 1984).  By contrast, when skilled labor is abundant, firms are in a 
better position to negotiate contracts in their favor.  Under these circumstances, firms 
are tempted to exploit flexible opportunities generated by market arrangements and 
increase their independence from labor (Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984).  Consistent with 
these arguments, Bridges and Villemez (1991) found a positive effect of labor scarcity 
on the presence of due process governance.  Althauser (1989) conducted a 
comprehensive review of literature and concluded that conditions of external labor 
markets strongly influence governance decisions.  Therefore, the larger the relative 
supply of skilled labor in the local labor market, the more likely firms are to adopt 
short-term contracts to manage employees. 
Hypothesis 1. A firm’s access to skilled labor in the local labor market will be 
positively associated with the adoption of temporary employment contracts.   
 
Companies regularly seek viable solutions to economize on labor costs 
(Houseman, 2001).  Employers are more likely to use temporary workers when there 
are substantial differences between the total labor costs of permanent and temporary 
workers (Osterman, 1987).  Analytically, total labor costs can be broken into the 
remuneration costs and friction costs.  Remuneration costs include rewards and 
resources that employees receive for their productive input.  They primarily consist of 
employee salaries and benefits.  Friction costs include the administrative costs to 
screen job applicants and negotiate a series of contracts to fill a position (Masters & 
Miles, 2002; Williamson, 1981).   In comparison to hiring permanent employees, the 
use of temporary employment contracts is associated with lower remuneration costs 
but higher friction costs.  Lower remuneration costs incur because the firm is able to 
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acquire a group of workers from the secondary labor market who are willing to accept 
pay rates below the market average (Doeringer & Piore, 1971).  These savings are 
variable depending on market conditions: when the pay rate in the primary labor 
market is high, employees have substantial leeway in holding down wages for 
temporary employees to minimum wage levels.  Therefore, the higher normal market 
rates, the greater savings on remuneration costs.  Meanwhile, friction costs depend on 
the frequency of transaction (i.e., replacements due to temporary worker turnover) and 
a firm’s administrative efficiency in refilling vacancies (Masters and Miles, 2002), 
relatively independent of labor market conditions.  When firms use temporary workers 
in a high-wage labor market, potential savings on remuneration costs are substantial 
while incurred friction costs are moderate.  For those operating in a low-wage market, 
however, savings on remuneration costs are much lower while friction costs are rather 
constant.  Therefore, companies operating in a low-wage labor market have low 
incentives to use temporary employment contracts. 
Hypothesis 2. A firm’s access to low-cost labor in the local labor market will be 
negatively associated with the adoption of temporary employment contracts.   
 
Product Market Conditions 
Product market conditions influence the demand for labor and the types of 
employment contracts that employers seek.  When demand fluctuations are high, 
employers need short-term labor that may be hired or let go as needed (Abraham & 
Taylor, 1996).   When companies are able to spread the risks of demand fluctuations, 
they can make more use of long-term employment contracts.  One way to spread 
demand risks is to increase geographic diversity of the product market.  When a call 
center provides concentrated services to multiple locations, its overall operations are 
less affected by unstable product demand that is specific to one location.  To this 
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extent, geographic diversification decreases the variability of a firm’s labor demand 
and thus reduces the need for short-term labor.  By contrast, when all customers are in 
the same location, companies are more sensitive to location-specific disturbances and 
therefore have strong incentives to use temporary employment contracts to safeguard 
themselves from external shocks.  Past research provides substantial evidence that 
workload variations and unstable employment levels are positively related to the use 
of temporary workers (Gramm & Schnell, 2001).   
Hypothesis 3. Geographic coverage of a firm’s product market is negatively 
associated with the adoption of temporary employment contracts.   
 
Political Conditions 
Beyond market conditions, government or political agents may influence 
employment practices.  Political agents may exert their influence on business 
operations by either limiting or increasing resources available to companies that are 
aligned with their goals and missions (Fligstein, 1996; Dobbin & Dowd, 1997).  
Policies to increase organizations’ resources range from financial incentives such as 
tax abatements to public services that are expensive for individual organizations to 
afford such as job recruitment and placement services, training resources, and site 
location assistance.  Because access to these resources requires state approval to obtain 
these resources, firms may adopt a compliance strategy so that their operation and 
management, including employment practices, are consistent with government 
standards (Pfeffer & Cohen, 1984; Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993).  In addition, 
companies receiving state resources often have to reveal important information about 
their strategic and internal operations.  Therefore, firms not only passively conform to 
the interests of government, but they deliberately reduce deviant behaviors to avoid 
further external monitoring and inspection (Oliver, 1991).  Moreover, as companies 
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receive state resources, the public often believe that these companies should live up to 
higher expectations such as providing stable employment.  For example, in the 
empirical context of China, Kim (2008) found that multinational companies allow the 
presence of unions in order to obtain social legitimacy and reduce the liability of 
foreignness.  Therefore, I predict that temporary employment contracts are less 
common among firms that are highly dependent on the government and state resources.   
Hypothesis 4.  Reliance on state resources is negatively associated with the use of 
temporary employment contracts.   
 
Next I examine the influence of political agents on state-owned enterprises 
compared to private businesses.  State-owned enterprises are at the core of China’s 
political economy (Granick, 1990; Lardy, 1998).  State-owned enterprises typically 
have features of a social institution that assigns non-contractual status rights and 
obligations to its members independent of their will and exchange value in the market 
(Donnelly, Gamble, Jackson, & Parkinson, 2001).  In addition to ownership ties, these 
companies are inseparable from the government because a majority of CEOs and 
board members hold civil service rank.  These companies play a pivotal role in 
supporting the state’s industrial and economic policy.  Due to these bonds and high 
visibility, state-owned enterprises are under close scrutiny by the state and general 
public.  Resource dependency theory predicts that these firms adapt structures and 
strategies that are consistent with the norms that the state and the public favor.  
Nielsen and Smyth (2008) reported in a recent survey that respondents considered job 
stability as the most important consideration in choosing a job, followed by high 
income and opportunities of professional development.  Therefore, state-owned 
enterprises are expected to provide jobs that meet these expectations.   Moreover, 
research on organizational inertia suggests that state-owned enterprises are limited in 
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their ability to adopt temporary employment contracts because of their historical 
heritage of life-long employment (e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983).  By contrast, private companies have greater autonomy to use temporary 
employment contracts because the social and institutional pressures to legitimize 
permanent employment are low.  When private businesses believe that temporary 
employment contracts help them to achieve competitive position in the market place, 
they are more likely to withhold commitment to employees and exercise their right to 
discontinue employment contracts whenever necessary. 
Hypothesis 5a. State ownership will be negatively associated with the adoption of 
temporary employment contracts.   
 
Institutional theorists also recognize that in the context of radical 
environmental changes, organizations may adopt practices that are contradictory to 
their conventional ways of operation in order to improve survival prospects (Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986; Gersick, 1991).  Applying this idea to the adoption of temporary 
employment contracts in state-owned enterprises is informative.  State-owned 
enterprises in China historically kept a large number of unproductive workers on their 
payrolls in order to support the government’s political goal of full employment.  In 
return, these companies received many forms of subsidies from the government.  
Compared to state-owned enterprises, foreign companies and private domestic 
companies came into operation mainly driven by the imperative of economic 
performance.  These firms were not politically or socially confined to the mode of 
permanent employment as were state-owned enterprises (Child, 1996).   
When China embarked on a massive transformation to socialistic market 
economy in the early 1990s, the state considerably reduced subsidiaries to state-owned 
enterprises, granted them substantial autonomy, and more importantly, pushed them to 
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compete with private domestic businesses and foreign companies.  Not surprisingly, 
state-owned enterprises shortly found themselves in severe stress and even decline 
(Putterman & Dong, 2000).  Compared to competitors of other ownership types that 
strive for core competence and long-term growth, state-owned enterprises need to 
satisfy the immediate concern of overstaffing (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).   For 
example, Lee (1998) found that massive layoffs and job losses have resulted from 
large-scale restructuring in state-owned enterprises.  By the same token, state-owned 
enterprises may view temporary employment contracts as a fiscally viable option.  
First, it allows these companies to lower wages and fringe benefits.  Second, it sends a 
signal to permanent workers that alternative sources of labor are readily available to 
replace those who are not productive.  Finally, when temporary workers (especially 
agency workers) do not appear on the payroll, the use of temporary employment 
contracts becomes a “window dressing” tactic to reduce headcount in a short time.  
These arguments imply a positive relationship between state ownership and the spread 
of temporary employment contracts.    
Hypothesis 5b. State ownership will be positively associated with the adoption of 
temporary employment contracts.   
  
Capital Market Conditions 
In recent decades, financial markets have come to play a significant role in 
shaping the structure and strategy of companies (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1998; Fligstein 
& Brantley, 1992).  Firms become increasingly sensitive to how financial markets 
value them and some have oriented their behavior to financial markets.  Prior studies 
have found that financial market actors construct different ideal business strategies 
(Thomas & Waring, 1999) and that these preferences of important actors, especially 
shareholders’ interests in overseeing their investments, exert substantial influence over 
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managerial choices in human resource management (Black, Gospel & Pendleton, 2007; 
Froud, Haslam, Johal, & Williams, 2000).     
Whereas a private company primarily raises capital internally or through 
leveraged debt, a publicly listed company is legally authorized to obtain a listing on a 
stock exchange and sell their shares to the public at large.  Because the liquidity of an 
open trading market provides investors with a low-cost exit option, these investors 
view listed firms as a bundle of assets that are deployed in order to maximize 
relatively short-term earnings (Fligstein & Brantley, 1992).  The capital market, 
through an information-processing mechanism of stock pricing, transmits these values 
and expectations to company managers (Fama, 1980).  As a result, listed firms tend to 
place more emphasis on narrow financial objectives (e.g., share price and dividend 
payouts) rather than boarder objectives such as market share (Konzelmann, Conway, 
Trenberth, & Wilkinson, 2006).  From an agency perspective, managers have 
incentives to boost stock price because the exit of portfolio investors often leads to a 
change of management (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Conversely, managers gain autonomy and job security when a firm’s stock market 
performance is endorsed by security analysts and equity investors.   
Recent studies have suggested a firm’s emphasis on stock market performance 
and shareholder value maximization is associated with management actions to breach 
implicit contracts and withdraw commitment to workers (Conway, Deakin, 
Konzelmann, Petit, Reberioux, & Wilkinson, 2008; Gospel & Pendleton, 2003).  
Specifically, managers tend to adopt a cost-oriented approach to human resources in 
order to facilitate the use of financial measures in internal capital allocations, to 
restrict long-term claims by employees against the firm, and to create a sense of 
insecurity among incumbent employees.  Empirical work shows that an emphasis on 
shareholder value is accompanied by increases in downsizing, reductions in job tenure, 
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and a decline in job security (Cappelli, Bassi, Katz, Knoke, Osterman, & Useem, 
1997).  Black and colleagues (2008) compared employment flexibility in a set of 
OECD countries.  They found that equity market trading activity is associated with 
shorter job tenure and greater employment change over the cycle, even when the 
influences such as government and labor institutions are controlled for.  These studies 
suggest that intensified pressure to promote the interests of capital market investors 
has shifted the balance in managerial decision making against the interests of 
employees as long-term stakeholders.  Therefore, I predict that listed companies are 
likely to use a higher proportion of temporary employees. 
Hypothesis 6.  Public market listing will be positively associated with the adoption 
of temporary employment contracts. 
 
Research in financial economics generally treats investors in equity markets as 
a homogeneous group of investors who elicit a common interest on maximizing 
investment value (Bagwell, 1991).  This view has recently been challenged by 
evidence that different exchange markets may impose different normative belief 
structures (Fiss & Zajac, 2004).  These scholars argue that substantial variation exists 
among companies listed in different trade platforms as a result of divergent 
expectations and values about good governance embedded in financial markets.  This 
study considers the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the largest securities market 
in the U.S., as a prime example that elicits shareholder-oriented values and the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance.  Relative to NYSE listed companies, this 
study examines the use of temporary employment contracts among firms listed on the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) and 
Chinese Stock Exchanges.  Although both are located in the same country and provide 
similar services, scholars argue that the NASDAQ manifests distinct values and favors 
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different organizational strategies than the NYSE (Corwin & Harris, 2001).  Variation 
between firms listed on these exchanges stems mostly from dispersion of ownership, 
insider representation on boards, and distinct approaches to managing uncertainties.  
The capacity for shareholders to exert influence via formal control of equity is 
dependent upon the degree of dispersion of share ownership and the extent to which 
share holders can coordinate their actions (De Alessi, 1973).  When ownership is 
highly dispersed, shareholders have little incentive to monitor manager behaviors or to 
exert influence directly because their voting powers are insignificant (Grossman & 
Hart, 1980).  Alternatively, they prefer to exert influence indirectly via secondary 
trading.  By contrast, where ownership is concentrated, equity owners can rely on their 
potential voting power to intervene directly with management.  Whereas NYSE 
companies are more likely to be diversely owned by mutual funds and independent 
investors whose power over corporate decisions is relatively weak (Falkenstein, 1996), 
shareholders of NASDAQ companies are more likely to exercise their control over 
firm actions as business owners.  
Furthermore, compared to those of NYSE companies, corporate boards of 
NASDAQ companies are usually smaller and represented by a higher proportion of 
insiders.  Whereas NYSE investors tend to eschew direct involvement in board 
activities and exert influence via market mechanisms (buying and selling investment), 
large finance providers of NASDAQ companies are more likely to play a very direct 
role and occupy seats on the corporate board.  Research on board behavior suggests 
that insider representation leads to better information flows within the boardrooms and 
hence strengthens board participation in the strategic decision process (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990).  As a result, these companies are more likely to recognize human 
resources as strategic assets that contribute to long-term successes.  
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Finally, the exchanges represent different preferred habitats for issuer 
companies, business executives, and even investors in the capital markets: typically 
the NYSE features the largest and most mature organizations and the NASDAQ 
represents new businesses.  Business executives of NASDAQ companies are 
exemplary of entrepreneurs who favor opportunities and risks.  They are enthusiastic 
about business uncertainties and are prepared to cope with risks involved in major 
investments.  Moreover, these managers with entrepreneurial traits are not only driven 
by interests of external investors; rather, they are motivated by an overwhelming need 
for achievement and a strong urge to build (McClelland 1961; Zhao & Seibert, 2006).  
Therefore, NASDAQ companies have a tendency to invest in intangible assets such as 
human resources rather than trying to maximize level of dividends and pay out the 
share price.   
In sum, differences between the NYSE and the NASDAQ lead to systematic 
variations of business strategies and employment practices among firms listed on these 
trading platforms.  Compared to those listed on NYSE, NADAQ companies and their 
managers are more concerned about prospects for future profitability and have more 
discretion in making long-term oriented decisions.  Accordingly, NASDAQ 
companies are more likely to take a long-term and strategic perspective toward human 
resource.  
Hypothesis 7. Public listing on the NASDAQ will be associated with less use of 
temporary employment contracts than listing on the NYSE. 
 
This study also attempts to draw a comparison between companies listed on 
the NYSE and Chinese stock exchanges.  China established its stock exchanges 
(Shanghai and Shenzhen) in the early 1990s as an effort to develop effective corporate 
governance structures and emulate the stylized NYSE model.  However, scholars 
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argue that companies listed on Chinese stock exchanges are operating according to 
substantively different institutional environments than those of the NYSE.  As a result, 
Chinese listed companies adopt distinct employment practices that manifest those 
differences. 
In contrast to the dispersed ownership among NYSE companies, Chinese listed 
companies are characterized by concentrated ownership with the state as the majority 
shareholder (Guthrie, Xiao, & Wang, 2007).  In the absence of effective representation 
from shareholders, the company board is made up of a majority of executive directors 
and senior managers appointed by the government, as well as a limited number of 
independent directors.  As Xu and Wang (1999) reported, individual shareholders have 
no more than 0.3% of the seats on average even though they as a group possess 
approximately one third of total outstanding shares.  However, the state is 
overrepresented on the board as 50% of positions are filled by government officials, 
substantially higher than its 30% of average stake in the stock companies.  As a result, 
among Chinese listed companies, government and corporate managers exert 
substantial control in setting company objectives to maximize their self interests rather 
than giving primacy to the interests of shareholders. 
In addition to divergence in composition, Chinese listed companies and NYSE 
companies differ in board structure.  Specifically, China’s Company Law requires all 
listed firms to adopt a two-tiered board as opposed to a unitary board as characterized 
by the NYSE.  In addition to the board of directors, which is a decision making unit 
equivalent to a board in NYSE, Chinese companies also have a supervisory board 
(Dahya, Karbhari, & Xiao, 2002).  The supervisory board is small in size and usually 
has labor union and major shareholder representation.  Although the supervisory board 
only has a loosely defined monitoring role over the board of directors and managers, it 
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is conceivable that the two-tiered board structure helps address conflicting interests of 
multiple stakeholders including employees (Xiao, Dahya, & Lin, 2004).   
The rule of law and the principle of arm’s length transactions provide a 
cornerstone for the NYSE model of corporate governance.  In China, however, 
corporate laws and securities regulations have only been recently introduced, and 
rampant government interventions in business activities are still well known (Pistor & 
Xu, 2005).  In addition, while there has been progress in developing independent 
professional organizations such as accounting and brokerage firms, as well as a 
watchful mass media sector, these organizations in general have yet to play an active 
monitoring role (Liebman & Milhaupt, 2008).  This significantly increases the costs of 
collecting timely and accurate information on corporate performance.  It also hinders 
equity investors’ capability of placing actual influence over company directors and 
managers.  
In sum, Chinese listed companies operate in a very different ownership, 
financial, and institutional environment from those of the NYSE model.   Government, 
corporate managers, and even employees have far more prominent roles in the 
operation of Chinese listed companies than in NYSE companies.  Chinese listed 
companies are likely to promote multiple interests in making employment decisions, 
rather than an emphasis on shareholder wealth as espoused by NYSE companies. 
Hypothesis 8. Public listing on Chinese stock exchanges (i.e., Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) will be associated with less use of temporary employment contracts 
than listing on the NYSE. 
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METHODS  
Sample 
Prior studies in strategic human resource management suggest that focusing on 
one organizational and occupational context reduces the confounding effects of 
industry heterogeneity (Batt, 2002).  In this study, I focus on call centers as the 
empirical setting.  This setting is practically important because by 2008, 600,000 
people were working in call centers in China (CNCCA, 2008).  This emerging sector 
becomes an important source of job creation and economic development.  It is of 
theoretical importance because the call center sector allows many conflicting forces to 
unfold.  On one hand, call centers span the interface of organization-customer 
interaction and have taken on more strategic importance for firms.  On the other hand, 
call center operations are mostly driven by cost and efficiency.  These forces lead to 
substantial variation in designing and adopting employment contracts in call centers.  
Therefore, customer contact centers in China provide an appropriate setting for 
assessing how competing forces shape the choice of employment contracts. 
Call centers are an emerging business in China.  They were so new in 2006 
that there were no official directories available.  To construct the sampling frame, I 
collected and compiled a list of call center names, as many as possible, from multiple 
sources including newspaper, professional magazines, membership directory of the 
professional association, client lists of staffing agencies and equipment manufacturers.  
This resulted in a list of over 600 call centers.  I then attempted to obtain the names 
and contact information of respondents: managers who ran these centers.  I gained 
access to the subscriber database of the Call Center Magazine, the most popular 
professional magazine for people who are interested in call center operations 
(including but not limited to call centers managers).  I was able to match contact 
information of managers in 187 call centers.  I made a phone call to each of the 
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managers and invited them to participate in the project.  137 managers agreed to 
participate.  In total, 102 call centers returned surveys, with a response rate of 74%, or 
55% of the original 187 establishments.  I mapped out call centers participated in the 
survey on Figure 3.1.  Each red dot represents one establishment in the sample.  These 
centers were located in 28 cities and represented multiple industries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Distribution of Establishments in the Study Sample 
 
1. Each red dot represents an establishment in the study sample (102 in total). 
2. Map of China is from the University of Texas Libraries: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_pop_1971.jpg 
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Measures 
The dependent variable, use of temporary employment contracts, is measured 
as the proportion of employees who are hired on a short-term basis, including 
temporary direct hires and workers placed by a temporary help agency.  This measure 
extends previous studies that examine the likelihood of using temporary employees as 
a binary variable (e.g., Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993; Gramm & Schnell, 2001; 
Houseman, 2001; Uzzi & Barsness, 1998). 
Use of state resources was measured as the number of public and government 
resources that a company is using, which include job recruitment and replacement 
services, training resources/programs, site location assistance, and tax abatements.  I 
operationalized state ownership using a dummy variable which assessed whether the 
company is predominately owned by the state (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0).   
Publicly traded status was measured as a dummy variable (publicly listed =1, 
private=0).  For all publicly listed companies, I retrieved their recent financial reports 
and obtained information of the listed market.  Among publicly listed companies, I 
used a set of dummy variable to measure a firm’s listed capital markets as a 
categorical variables, including the NYSE (the omitted category), NADSAQ, Chinese 
stock exchanges (mainland China, including Shanghai and Shenzhen), and other 
markets (including Hong Kong Stock Exchange, stock exchanges in European 
countries and other Asian countries).  Eight out of 54 publicly traded companies in this 
sample were cross-listed on both the NYSE and Hong Kong Stock Exchange.   I 
categorized them as NYSE listed companies because prior research suggests that 
companies are driven by values and practices of prestigious, well-established 
institutions such as the NYSE (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). 
Finally, I included a number of control variables that may be relevant to the 
decision of employment strategies.  I measured organizational size as the number of 
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customer service employees at a work site.  Prior research has suggested that 
organizational size relates to personnel decisions because larger organizations should 
have more resources than smaller ones and are more likely to create internal labor 
markets simply because they can afford to do so (Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993).  An 
organization’s age is the number of years elapsed between its founding and the present.  
Organizational age may affect organizational processes because those founded 
chronologically earlier than others in different environmental conditions may yield 
different behaviors than those founded later (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Subsidiaries belonging to a larger parent company may have 
limited degrees of freedom in deciding HR policies. Therefore I controlled for whether 
the call center was an independent company (coded as 0) or part of a larger 
organization (coded as 1) as a measure of task complexity.  A dummy variable was 
introduced to indicate whether inbound calls (coded as 0) or outbound calls (coded as 
1) comprise the largest volume of calls in the call center. I controlled for industry 
types using a set of dummy variables, including telecommunications, financial 
services, manufacturing and other industries (omitted category).   Finally, as the call 
centers are located in different cities and provinces, I used the regional minimum wage 
to control for regional differences in labor policy and economic conditions. 
 
Model Specifications 
A typical way to estimate the hypothesized model is to use linear multiple 
regression, which can be mathematically formulated as:  
βxxyE =)|(   (1) 
where y is the dependent variable (i.e., the proportion of employees on short-term 
contracts) and x includes all independent variables.  Although equation (1) is 
straightforward, the fact that the dependent variable is a fractional response -- bounded 
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between 0 and 1 -- may raise statistical concerns.  There is no guarantee that the 
predicted value lies within bounds, a similar problem as in the linear probability model 
for binary data.  This could be a serious problem when a large proportion of y takes on 
the values 0 or 1.  Therefore, I used quasi-likelihood estimation methods for regression 
models as suggested by Papke and Woodridge’s (1996).  Compared to ordinary 
regression models and log-odds type procedures, the quasi-likelihood estimation 
method effectively estimates fractional dependent variables while there is no need to 
use ad hoc transformations to handle data at the extreme values of zero and one.  
Mathematically, I estimated the following model: 
)()|( βxGxyE =   (2) 
where G(.) takes the standard log-odds functional form.  
 
RESULTS  
Table 3.1 reports basic descriptive statistics and correlations.  As suggested by 
the descriptive statistics, call centers in this sample, on average, applied temporary 
employment contracts to 29% of their workforce.  Seventeen percent of companies in 
the sample were predominately owned by the state and 55% companies are publicly 
traded, including 17% listed on the NYSE, 8% on the NASDAQ, and 9% on Chinese 
stock exchanges.  In addition, an average call center used more than one kind of public 
assistance program such as recruitment and placement services.   Moreover, the 
correlation coefficients indicate that there are no major correlational problems with the 
variables reported.   
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (6) (5)  
            
1. Proportion of  
temporary workers  0.29 0.35          
2. Access to skilled labor 2.99 1.16 0.103         
3. Access to low-cost labor 2.24 1.07 0.044  0.050       
4. Product market coverage 2.55 0.85 -0.465 * 0.011 -0.213      
5. Use of state resources 1.30 1.23 -0.037  0.198 0.305 0.022   
6. State-owned companies 0.17 0.37 0.551 * 0.072 0.071 -0.512 * -0.025   
7. Non-listed companies 0.45 0.50 -0.215  -0.078 0.023 0.058  0.065 -0.353 * 
8. NYSE listed companies 0.17 0.37 0.430 * 0.072 0.202 -0.325  0.061 0.577 * 
9. NASDAQ listed companies 0.08 0.27 -0.093  0.003 -0.271 0.197  -0.043 -0.131  
10. Chinese stock exchanges  
     listed companies 0.09 0.29 -0.008  -0.027 -0.070 0.164  0.036 -0.046  
11. Other listed companies 0.22 0.41 -0.064  0.045 0.015 -0.019  -0.131 0.021  
12. Organization size 359.92 770.79 0.153  0.274 0.021 -0.004  0.273 0.197  
13. Organization age 0.51 0.50 -0.239  -0.206 0.012 0.069  0.009 -0.305  
14. Part of a larger 
      organization 0.89 0.31 -0.030  -0.140 -0.196 -0.034  -0.173 0.156  
15. Outbound calls 0.21 0.41 -0.131  0.026 0.119 0.039  0.052 -0.163  
16. Industry: telecommunications 0.31 0.47 0.298  0.061 0.210 -0.283  0.057 0.378 * 
17. Industry: financial services 0.28 0.45 -0.200  -0.051 -0.101 0.143  -0.068 -0.165  
18. Industry: manufacturing 0.24 0.43 -0.154  0.145 -0.141 0.396 * 0.013 -0.186  
19. regional minimum wage 562.73 76.07 0.108  0.190 -0.296 0.105  -0.156 0.126  
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
Variables (7)  (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
               
8. -0.405 *             
9. -0.264  -0.131            
10. -0.282  -0.139  -0.091          
11. -0.475 * -0.235  -0.153 -0.163         
12. -0.242  0.219  0.052 -0.091 0.123        
13. 0.212  -0.252  -0.082 0.095 -0.040 -0.340       
14. -0.257  0.156  0.101 -0.003 0.106 0.011 0.042      
15. 0.269  -0.163  -0.058 -0.158 -0.031 0.095 -0.137 -0.136     
16. -0.103  0.435 * -0.197 -0.136 -0.046 0.332 -0.276 -0.037 0.022    
17. 0.215  -0.165  -0.184 -0.119 0.092 -0.063 0.026 0.149 -0.052 0.136   
18. -0.038  -0.062  -0.162 0.235 0.046 -0.012 -0.110 0.044 0.061 0.073 0.163  
19. -0.139  0.020  0.105 0.018 0.070 0.164 -0.136 0.209 -0.253 0.046 0.039 0.019
 
* Significant at .05 level; Bonferroni adjusted. 
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Table 3.2 
Results of Quasi-likelihood Estimation Predicting the Proportion of Temporary Employees 
 
 model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 
       
Org. size (# of EEs) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.001*** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Org. Age 0.170** 0.194** 0.018 0.397** 0.282*** 0.673** 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.076) (0.179) (0.096) (0.305) 
Part of a larger  -1.278** -2.418*** -1.174** -2.190** -1.344* -10.127*** 
organization (0.576) (0.620) (0.516) (0.904) (0.682) (2.678) 
Outbound calls 0.187 0.171 0.097 1.277 0.521 8.019*** 
 (0.566) (0.399) (0.404) (0.772) (0.598) (2.419) 
Industry       
     Telecommunications 9.828*** 1.007** 1.139** 12.895*** 2.131*** -4.633*** 
 (2.063) (0.473) (0.513) (2.723) (0.733) (1.264) 
     Financial services -9.956*** -1.755** -2.174*** -12.030*** -2.588*** 0.455 
 (2.181) (0.678) (0.699) (2.710) (0.837) (1.134) 
     Manufacturing -0.287 1.158** 0.235 -0.924 -1.357* 5.857*** 
 (0.567) (0.582) (0.527) (0.719) (0.700) (2.073) 
Regional minimum -0.000 0.007*** -0.001 0.000 0.004** 0.022*** 
wage (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
       
Access to skilled labor  0.700***    2.507** 
  (0.237)    (1.039) 
Access to cheap labor  -0.152    -1.028** 
  (0.158)    (0.505) 
Product market coverage  -2.399***    -6.631*** 
  (0.410)    (2.099) 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 
 model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 model6 
       
Use of state resources   -0.141   -2.395** 
   (0.155)   (1.096) 
State-owned 
companies 
  3.909***   7.863*** 
   (0.643)   (2.443) 
       
Not publicly listed    -2.100** -4.353*** -5.459** 
    (0.842) (0.975) (2.179) 
Listed on NASDAQ     -4.042*** -5.914* 
     (0.897) (3.107) 
Listed on Chinese     -2.250*** 1.837 
Stock exchanges     (0.791) (2.901) 
Listed outside of     -4.303*** -12.965** 
U.S. and mainland 
China 
    (0.957) (4.960) 
       
R2 0.879 0.926 0.916 0.882 0.906 0.960 
       
 
1. n=102 
2. Standard errors in parentheses 
3. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.2 provides regression results based on the quasi-likelihood estimation 
method.  The dependent variable is the proportion of employees on temporary 
contracts among all non-supervisory employees in the largest occupational group in 
each establishment.  Model 1 includes only the control variables, while Models 2 
through 5 add predictors -- such as conditions of labor and product markets, relations 
with political entities, and listed status and capital markets, as specified in the model.  
Model 6 presents the full model with all independent and control variables.  
Results of Model 1 show that smaller and older establishments are more likely 
to use temporary employment contracts.  However, when independent variables are 
included in subsequent models, the negative effect of employment size goes away, and 
the variable actually turns positive in the final model.  This pattern indicates that 
perhaps organizational size is highly correlated with other variables in the model.  
Finally, a small but positive effect of regional minimal wage suggests that employers 
tend to use more temporary contracts when labor regulations on employment activities 
such as minimal wage levels are high.  In all, the results show that these control 
variables account for a significant amount of total variation of the dependent variable.  
Model 2 shows that conditions of the labor market and product market 
significantly affect employers’ adoption of temporary employment contracts.  Results 
suggest that access to adequate skilled labor is positively related to the use of 
temporary employees.  Hypothesis 1 is supported.  Although not significant in the 
partial model (Model 2), access to low-cost labor is a significant predictor of the 
adoption of temporary employment contracts in the full model (Model 6).  This 
provides some support for Hypothesis 2.  Finally, the extent to which a company 
provides services to multiple geographic areas is negatively related to the use the 
temporary employment contracts (Hypothesis 3).  Taken together, the findings support 
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the idea that companies adopt employment strategies to adapt to the competitive 
conditions of external labor and product markets. 
Model 3 tests the effects of political conditions on a firm’s employment 
practices.  Hypothesis 4 predicted a negative relationship between reliance on state 
resources and the use of temporary employment contracts.  Even though such an effect 
is not significant in the partial model (Model 3), the full model (Model 6) indicates 
that companies that use state resources make significantly less use of temporary 
employment contracts, thus providing support for Hypothesis 5.  This result is 
consistent with the argument that firms that are highly dependent on the government 
and public resources are likely to manage that dependence by adopting employment 
practices that conform to the interests of government.  Hypothesis 5a and 5b provide 
competing arguments for the effects of state ownership on employment decisions.  The 
results suggest that state-owned companies are likely to use a larger proportion of 
temporary employees in regular positions than non-state-owned enterprises.  The 
difference between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises in the proportion of 
temporary employees used is even greater in the full model (rising from 4% to 8%).  
This finding provides support for Hypothesis 5b, which states that state-owned 
enterprises trigger the use of divergent employment practices to cope with the radical 
changes that they are experiencing in recent years.   
Hypotheses 6–8 predict that firms use different governance structures and 
employment strategies to respond to the preferences and expectations of important 
actors in the financial markets.   Model 4 tests whether a firm’s employment practices 
are related to its public trading status.  Consistent with prior research, I find that public 
listed firms make significantly greater use of short-term employment contracts.  To 
test whether different capital markets impose heterogeneous values on management 
decision making, Model 5 and 6 provide analyses to compare the adoption of 
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temporary employment contracts among companies listed on the NASDAQ, Chinese 
stock exchanges, and the NYSE.  Consistent with hypothesized predictions, the results 
of Model 5 suggest that companies listed on the NYSE use a higher proportion of 
temporary employees than those listed on the NASDAQ and Chinese stock exchanges.   
The effect of Chinese stock exchanges listing becomes statistically insignificant, when 
control variables and other predictors are included in the full model.  
 
DISCUSSION 
As firms move away from permanent employment relationships to short-term 
labor contracts, employment systems are evolving into alternative forms, even though 
these new changes are contested, and contradictory to the interests of the government 
and employees.  This study has sought to address this issue theoretically and 
empirically in the context of the spread of temporary employment contracts in the 
service industry in China.  This study generates several important findings.  First, 
firms hire temporary employees in regular positions to exploit market opportunities 
when the labor market provides an adequate flow of skilled labor and when the 
product market covers multiple geographic locations.  Second, firms highly dependent 
on public resources tend to maintain the long-term employment tradition to manage 
their relationship with political agencies.  Nevertheless, in face of radical 
transformation which adversely affects survival prospects, state-owned enterprises are 
adopting short-term labor contracts to disrupt entrenched practices of life-long 
employment and overstaffing.  Finally, even controlling for market pressures or 
political considerations, I found that capital markets and equity investors have a 
significant impact on the ways firms manage human resources.  As driven by 
shareholder oriented values and a focus on short-term returns, publicly traded 
companies are more likely than non-listed companies to use temporary work.  Also, 
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NYSE listed companies are more likely to use a higher proportion of temporary 
employees significantly than those listed on the NASDAQ and Chinese stock 
exchanges. 
This study contributes to human resource management research and 
organizational theories in several ways.  First, this study supports a strategic view of 
the use of temporary employment contracts in the modern workplace.  The findings 
suggest that temporary employment contracts are not limited to a few firms and 
industries, but across large sectors of the labor market.  More importantly, this study 
found that the use of temporary employment contracts is significantly associated with 
a set of organizational and environmental variables which are relatively stable over 
time (such as product market diversification, use of state resources, ownership 
arrangements, and financial structures).  This finding importantly extends prior 
research which examined how companies use temporary work to respond to short-term, 
temporary changes in the business environment.  Rather, this study indicates that the 
use of temporary employment contracts can represent a permanent feature of a firm’s 
HR strategy.   
Second, this study contributes to the emerging literature on the relationship 
between financial structures, corporate governance, and employment relationships.  In 
this study, publicly listed firms, which are driven by shareholder values and short-term 
returns, made significantly greater use of temporary employment contracts than firms 
that are not publicly traded.  This finding provides empirical support for prior 
conceptual work that an increasing emphasis on share values imposes adverse impact 
on the interests of employees as long-term stakeholders.  Moreover, findings of this 
study are consistent with a contingency theory of equity ownership by showing that 
the influence of equity investors may vary depending on characteristics of these 
investors and their trading platforms.  Financial economists often assume homogeneity 
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of shareholder interests and limit their analyses to the effects of share concentration.  
My theoretical arguments on the differences between the NASDAQ, Chinese stock 
exchanges, and the NYSE as well as the empirical results provide evidence that 
different public capital markets elicit different value systems and types of investors 
favor divergent interests.   
Third, results of this study indicate that state-owned enterprises are more 
aggressive in adopting temporary employment contracts.  It suggests that 
organizational actors are not necessarily bounded by history or taken-for-granted 
practices.  Instead, they radically move away from the life-time employment tradition 
in order to enhance their survival prospects in market competition.  
Finally, this study demonstrates that institutional actors have multiple and 
often inconsistent interests (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991).  In the context of 
this study, market competition, political agents, and investors produce divergent forces 
that aimed to promote or inhibit the spread of temporary employment contracts.  
Managers strategically design various forms of employment contracts in order to 
respond to these forces.  These findings are consistent with the arguments that 
technical efficiency and rationality are socially embedded (Lounsbury, 2007).  
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CHAPTER 4 
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES, HIGH INVOVLEMENT 
HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES, AND OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
As the business environment has become increasingly dynamic and 
unpredictable, organizations have been seeking ways to increase their flexibility, or 
the ability to respond readily to demand fluctuations and external shocks.  Researchers 
believe that organizational flexibility generates competitive advantages because 
flexible firms are capable of defending against threats and moving rapidly to take 
advantage of opportunities (Kulatilaka & Marks, 1988; Sanchez, 1995; Volberda, 
1996).  For example, they are able to introduce new products frequently, offer broader 
service options, and switch from one product to another quickly (Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996). 
A central feature of a flexible firm lies in its ability to manage its human 
resources in response to changing technological and market opportunities (Smith, 
1997).  Prior literature has emphasized two distinct forms of human resource (HR) 
flexibility (Atkinson, 1984; Cappelli & Neumark, 2004; Kalleberg, 2001).  An 
organization obtains functional flexibility when a stable cohort of employees with 
multiple skills can competently perform a range of tasks and adapt to change.  
Numerical flexibility refers to an organization’s ability to expand or shrink the size of 
its workforce quickly and easily in line with changes of market demands.  Prior 
research on these two forms of HR flexibility has developed along rather independent 
lines, each aimed at understanding one of the two forms.  On the one hand, the 
literature on functional flexibility identifies the benefits of high involvement HR 
practices which encourage and enable employees to develop multiple skills and 
participate in workplace decisions.  Prior research suggests that high involvement HR 
practices can develop a functionally flexible workforce because employees are willing 
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to invest in general and firm-specific skills and are competent to take on new roles for 
the benefit of the organization (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Batt, 
2002).  On the other hand, scholars in the area of labor markets and employment 
contracts examine how firms make use of market-based solutions to bring in human 
capital on a temporary basis in order to reduce the costs, commitment, and legal 
responsibilities associated with permanent workers (Houseman, 2001).  Despite 
significant progress in each research line, only a limited number of studies have 
addressed the possible relationships between functional and numerical flexibility (e.g., 
Atkinson, 1984; Kalleberg, 2001; Magnum, Mayoll, & Nelson, 1985).  Implicit in 
these studies, however, is an untested assumption of a segmentation approach to 
human resources, which assumes that companies manage two disparate employment 
subsystems, one to achieve functional flexibility and the order to obtain numerical 
flexibility.  
Recent studies have documented that a growing number of firms are taking a 
planned, strategic approach to temporary work.  These firms intensively use short-term 
employees in work activities for on-going production activities, rather than for project-
based work or temporal demand shocks (Barley & Kunda, 2004; Matusik & Hills, 
1998; Smith, 2002).  Moreover, they integrate contingent and regular workers in the 
same job, organize them side by side, and even elicit similar performance objectives 
(Bidwell, 2009; Davis-Blake, Broschak, & George, 2003; Lautsch, 2002).  In this 
study, I refer to management policies and actions that incorporate temporary work into 
a firm’s human resource strategy as “alternative employment strategies”.  I develop 
this concept with reference to typical employment relationships in which the employer 
directs the worker’s activities at his premise and makes an implicit promise that 
employment will continue into the future with open ended duration (Kalleberg, 2000; 
Summers, 1997).  Although types of employment contracts may involve distinct forms 
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of exchange arrangements and power relations between employer and employees, 
prior HR literature tends to make little of these contractual distinctions.  Instead, these 
studies assume that the effects of HR practices are equal throughout the workforce.   
The purpose of this study is to address three issues.  First, drawing upon social 
exchange theories and economic theories, I develop and empirically test the 
relationship between the use of alternative employment strategies and operational 
performance at the establishment level.  Second, I examine whether the adoption of 
high involvement HR practices is associated with operational effectiveness.  Finally, 
to explore the inherent paradox of these two approaches to human resources, I 
investigate the possible interactive effects of alternative employment strategies and 
high involvement HR practices on operational effectiveness. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Numerical Flexibility: Effects of Alternative Employment Strategies 
A firm may have several options to adjust organizational staffing levels and 
achieve numerical flexibility, such as overtime, flextime, job-sharing, and compressed 
workweeks.  Among these options, an organization’s decision to use short-term direct 
hires and temporary agency workers has received most scholarly attention because 
these arrangements allow employers to fundamentally alter the size of workforce 
without undergoing downsizing and layoffs (Kalleberg, 2001).  In this study, I focus 
on the use of temporary work as the means to enhance numerical flexibility. 
Early research examined temporary work primarily as a means to 
accommodate short-term staffing or scheduling needs and therefore it did not clearly 
develop a link between alternative employment strategies and organizational 
effectiveness.  As firms begin to use temporary workers extensively in regular 
positions, however, it is important to know whether employers achieve numerical 
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flexibility at the cost of operational performance.  Perspectives of economic and social 
exchange theories both suggest that externalization of labor may be detrimental 
because employers’ withdrawal of commitment to long-term employment 
relationships inhibits the development, exercise, and retention of employee skills and 
capabilities that contribute to organizational performance.  
Economic theories state that firms have to elicit job efforts from the workforce 
while reducing their tendency to act in their own interest rather than the firm’s interest.  
Long-term employment relationships help resolve these problems in several ways.  
First, career-oriented employment encourages workers to develop firm-specific human 
capital and therefore creates employee investments in the firm (Doeringer & Piore, 
1991; Osterman, 1984).  Second, stable employment decreases the need to negotiate a 
series of contracts to refill positions because of high employee turnover (Masters & 
Miles, 2002).  Third, long-term employment relationships align the interests of the 
employer and the employees.  Therefore, permanent employees are motivated to 
increase their work effort and minimize opportunistic behavior, even if they are not 
closely monitored (Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, 1975).  By contrast, productivity 
of temporary workers may be limited either because employees are not willing to 
invest in firm-specific skills or because they are not willing to engage in tasks that are 
not explicitly specified.  When the organization undertakes major changes such as a 
shift in technology and a sudden workload increase, temporary workers may insist on 
renegotiating their contracts if they perceive that the new responsibilities fall outside 
of the range specified by the current exchange relationship. 
Social exchange theorists posit that employee behaviors at work are contingent 
responses to the inducements they receive from the organization (Blau, 1964; 
Gouldner, 1960).   An open-ended, stable employment relationship embodies 
managers’ beliefs in the norm of reciprocity (Parks, Kidder, & Gallagher, 1998; Tsui, 
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Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997).  In return for the provision of job security, permanent 
workers are willing to reciprocate by going beyond the performance requirements of 
their jobs and exhibiting high levels of employee initiative and collaborative behavior 
in organizations.  For example, they are willing to help others, fulfill off-duty needs, 
and share constructive ideas to improve production processes and procedures.  
Employer inducements also strengthen employee retention because of stronger 
perceived obligations and higher perceived costs of living (Maertz & Campion, 2004).  
By contrast, when the employer insists on establishing a limited-term contract, 
employees may interpret this as a signal that no reciprocity is expected (Ashford, Lee, 
& Bobko, 1989).  Therefore, they respond by performing only required duties and 
engaging in perfunctory performance (Rousseau, 1995; Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 
1997).  For example, Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and Gupta argue that lack of job security 
implies a breach of informal organizational contracts.  As a result, employees diminish 
their attachment and perceived organizational responsibility.  Moreover, mixing 
temporary and permanent workers in the same workplace leads to conflicts among co-
workers (Geary, 1992) and greater supervision demands (Davis-Blake, Broschak, & 
George, 2003; Smith, 2002). 
Empirical support for these arguments, however, has been inconclusive 
(Connelly & Gallagher, 2004).  Van Dyne and Ang (1998) conducted a study in 
Singapore and showed that temporary workers engage in less organizational 
citizenship and have lower affective commitment than permanent employees.  Van 
Jaarsveld (2004) also found high levels of resentment among IT temporary workers at 
Microsoft because they had different and lower reward structures than permanent 
employees.  However, Pearce (1993) did not find significant behavioral differences 
between American employee engineers and their temporary co-workers in their 
willingness to help with extra tasks or their organizational commitment.  Finally, 
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Orlitzky and Frenkel (2005) reported that the proportion of part-time and female 
workers is associated with higher labor productivity.   
One explanation for these mixed results is that employees might have 
heterogeneous interpretations of organizational actions depending on the proportion of 
temporary workforce in the workplace.  For example, George (2003) argued that there 
are distinct points beyond which the proportion of temporary workers radically 
changes workplace dynamics and conveys different signals about managerial 
intentions.  In other words, sparse use and extensive use of temporary workers do not 
represent a difference of degrees; rather, they are qualitatively different.  For example, 
when temporary workers outnumber permanent workers, the use of alternative 
employment strategies may be interpreted as a substitution strategy to replace 
permanent workers rather than a complement to permanent employee activities.  
Under such circumstances, temporary workers gain power and become influential 
whereas permanent workers feel severely threatened and vulnerable.  Theory and 
research on relational demography supports these arguments.  These studies indicate 
that member compositional differences – such as age, gender, and ethnicity that make 
some members distinct from others in their teams – can have an impact on team 
processes and work outcomes (Jackson & Joshi, 2004; Kanter, 1977).  More 
importantly, these differences have distinct effects for minorities than for members of 
the majority (Mehra, Klduff, & Brass, 1998).  For example, Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly 
(1999) showed that whites and men demonstrated more negative reactions to increased 
unit heterogeneity than non-whites and women. Chattopadhyay (1999) found that race 
dissimilarity negatively influenced organization-based self-esteem, peer relations, and 
altruism for white employees in minority-dominated groups, but not for minority 
employees in white-dominated groups.  This argument is also consistent with my 
interviews with managers during field visits in China.  For example, a major 
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telecommunications company started to hire all new workers on the basis of temporary 
employment contracts in early 2000.  This policy change did not upset permanent 
employees in the first two years.  However, the number of temporary employees 
increased suddenly as a result of growing business demand.  In 2003, when permanent 
employees lost their majority status, they collectively confronted management with 
this policy and asked the company to address their concerns about job insecurity.  
Rather than reaffirming long-term commitment to permanent employees, management 
announced that “the company’s strategic needs” justified the presence of this policy.  
This resulted in low morale and a high quit rate among permanent employees. 
For these reasons, in this paper, I develop a two-dimensional conceptualization 
of alternative employment strategies in order to examine their impact on operational 
effectiveness.  The rationale underlying this conceptualization emphasizes that 
employee attitudes and behaviors, as a response to managerial strategies in the use of 
temporary contracts, are critical to organizational performance.  The first dimension is 
the contractual nature of the employment relationship (whether permanent or 
temporary) applied to the largest group of employees in the workplace.  This 
dimension defines the social status of permanent and temporary employees in the 
workplace.  The second dimension distinguishes whether the company adopts a 
homogeneous approach or a hybrid approach to managing employees.  This dimension 
conveys managerial beliefs of employment relationship and affects power relations 
among employees (George, 2003; Uzzi & Barsness, 1998).   Therefore, this 
conceptualization captures organization’s varying use of alternative employment 
strategies as four distinct modes: no use, low use, high use, and complete use of 
temporary employees (as shown in Figure 4.1).  An organization with the no-use mode 
offers open-ended employment contracts to all of its employees.  In the low use mode, 
an organization uses permanent employment contracts with most of its employees, 
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supplemented with a small group of temporary workers.  High use mode is one in 
which an organization uses temporary contracts with most of its employees and 
permanent contracts with only a small group of employees.  Finally, the complete 
mode includes organizations that keep all employees on the basis of temporary 
employment contracts.  Such a conceptualization extends prior research because it 
allows for varied interpretations in relation to each mode of alternative employment 
strategies and the consequent meanings attached to them.    
Hypothesis 1.  Operational performance will be higher in the no use mode of 
alternative employment strategies than in any of the other three modes of 
alternative employment strategies (i.e., low use, high use and complete use). 
 
 
         Homogeneous  Heterogeneous 
Dominated by 
permanent workers 
No use 
(temp =0) 
Low use 
(0<temp <50%) 
Dominated by  
temporary workers 
Complete use 
(temp =100%) 
High use 
(50%≤temp <100%) 
Figure 4.1 
Modes of Alternative Employment Strategies 
 
Functional Flexibility: Effects of High Involvement HR Practices 
A number of studies have examined the concepts of performance-enhancing 
HR practices and their relation to organizational performance.  Performance-
enhancing HR practices are a set of internally consistent management practices that 
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provide employees with skills, decision-making responsibility, and incentives that 
align their efforts with business successes (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006).  As 
such, organizations enhance their effectiveness and ability to adapt to changes because 
these practices enhance skill development of the workforce, provide an organization of 
work that facilitates learning and problem solving, and offer incentives to workers to 
use their skills as needed for the benefits of the organization (Appelbaum, Bailey, 
Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Batt, 2002). 
In search of the set of practices that constitute performance-enhancing HR 
practices, researchers have either derived conceptualizations from empirical data or 
from theory.  The evidence-driven approach identifies a set of HR systems based on 
statistical evidence of fit based on the empirical data.  These studies categorized firms 
into discrete bundles of HR practices, such as control and commitment systems 
(Arthur, 1992; 1994), traditional and innovative HR practices (Ichniowski, Shaw, & 
Prennushi, 1997), and bundle and module production systems (Dunlop & Weil, 1996).  
Although this approach reflects a strong intuitive appeal, there is little consensus on 
issues such as what possible HR bundles are and which practices constitute each 
bundle.  For example, Arthur’s (1994) high commitment system specifies a low 
emphasis on variable pay, whereas the innovative HR system defined by Ichniowski 
and colleagues (1997) has a strong emphasis on incentive pay plans.  Researchers 
commented that conceptual ambiguity associated with this approach has resulted in 
contradictory operationalization of this construct and conflicting empirical results 
(Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Delery, 1998).   
There is increasing evidence in support of the theory-driven approach, which 
derives a set of mutually reinforcing practices from a priori construction of HR 
theories (Delery, 1998).  As such, internal consistency is conceptually validated when 
organizations implement a set of theoretically driven HR practices.  Although 
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performance-enhancing HR practices have been defined in various ways along this 
line, researchers have increasingly concurred with the idea that high involvement HR 
practices contribute to organization-wide outcomes because they increase workforce 
skill levels, provide employees opportunities to use their skills, and create an incentive 
structure to encourage skill acquisition, retention, and participation (Appelbaum, 
Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Batt, 2002; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006).   
A number of studies have investigated the mechanisms that high involvement 
HR practices increase organizational effectiveness.  First, high involvement HR 
practices emphasize the selective hiring of employees with high general skills, a firm’s 
investment in initial training, and a relatively high skill requirement to proficiently 
perform tasks.  This combination provides a firm with a qualified workforce capable 
of ongoing learning.  Preuss (2003) reported that hospital employees with substantial 
job knowledge are more able to interpret equivocal job situations, which effectively 
reduces medical error incidence.  Batt (2002) argued that employees’ capacity to learn 
is critical because market competition leads to constant change in marketing, pricing, 
and packaging.  Employees need to integrate new product and service options into 
their existing knowledge in order to deliver quality service.  Liu and Batt (2007) found 
that telephone operators improve job productivity over time as they receive informal 
training as provided by supervisors and experienced peers.  
Second, high involvement HR practices involve the design of work to provide 
opportunities for individual discretion and learning through collaboration with other 
employees.  Employees with high individual discretion are able to respond 
immediately to customer demands and deliver quality service.  High-involvement HR 
practices also provide opportunities for continuous learning through participation in 
offline and online groups (Batt, 1999).  This allows employees to benefit from better 
learning and problem solving on how to handle customers and new technology.  
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Finally, the incentives dimension of high involvement HR practices includes HR 
practices such as variable pay based on individual performance, continuous investment 
in employees’ general skills and long-term development, and performance 
management systems that build trust.  For example, Liu and Batt (forthcoming) found 
that the workers exhibited higher performance where their supervisor emphasized 
group assignments and incentives to encourage collaborative learning in the workplace.  
Bartel (2004) found that employee satisfaction with incentive practices such as 
performance evaluation, feedback, and recognition is positively related to work unit 
performance.  
While some studies found evidence that a single dimension of high 
involvement HR practices can independently contribute to performance (e.g., Banker, 
Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 1996; Bartel, 2004; Terpstra & Rozell, 1993), many 
scholars argue that these practices support each other to improve organization-wide 
outcomes (e.g., Batt 2002; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006; MacDuffie 1995; 
Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996).  Employees have to develop job-related 
knowledge, skills, and abilities.  Then, the organizational structure and job designs 
should offer the latitude for them to deploy personal judgment and discretion.  Finally, 
even knowledgeable, skilled, and motivated employees will not leverage discretionary 
time and talent unless they are motivated to do so.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.  Operational performance will be higher when companies make 
greater use of high involvement HR practices. 
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Interactive Effects of Alternative Employment Strategies and High Involvement 
HR practices on Performance 
Previous discussions of the connection between alternative contractual 
arrangements and high involvement HR practices have primarily assumed that 
permanent and temporary employees are segmented and managed under different HR 
rules.  These studies assert that firms partition the workforce into core and peripheral 
components which fulfill separate organizational functions, so that firms can buffer 
the core by concentrating adverse variability on the margins (e.g., Atkinson, 1984; 
Drago, 1998; Mangum, Mayall, & Nelson, 1985).  In this way, organizations combine 
functional and numerical flexibility when they enact high involvement HR practices 
among permanent workers in core business activities and use short-term contracts 
among employees who perform routine functions (Kalleberg, 2001).  
The segmentation argument rests upon two assumptions.  First, temporary 
workers are less important to value creation and they are staffed in marginal functions.  
Second, firms use temporary workers to protect permanent workers at the core.  
However, recent studies have challenged these assumptions.  For example, Smith 
(2002) and Lautch (2003) provided evidence that companies deliberately use 
temporary workers in critical business functions in order to improve business 
performance, rather than to minimize labor costs.  Moreover, Cappelli & Neumark 
(2003) contradicted the buffering hypothesis by showing that the use of contingent 
work is positively related to dismissals and layoffs of the permanent workforce.  
Similarly, Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek (2003) found that employers used 
temporary employees in order to avoid raising wages for existing employees.  My 
research on the spread of temporary employment contracts in China (as discussed in 
the previous chapters) also provides strong evidence that firms are moving away from 
the segmentation approach to the integration approach, which creates a mixture of 
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permanent and temporary employees who work side-by-side in the same job and are 
organized into work teams.  Therefore, several researchers call for more conceptual 
endeavors to advance our understanding of the changing employment relationship.   
As temporary employees are integrated into the HR system governing 
permanent employees, firms seek to manage these workers in a way that their 
competence, autonomy, and commitment can directly contribute to organizational 
effectiveness.  Recent studies provide evidence that employers may adopt high 
involvement HR practices for both permanent and temporary employees.  For example, 
Orlitzky and Frenkel (2005) examined the effects of high involvement HR practices 
on part-time employees.  Along this line, I test whether the relationships between 
modes of alternative employment strategies and operational performance will be 
enhanced or diminished, depending on the extent to which high involvement HR 
practices are used in combination.  
As stated by social exchange theory, individuals are obligated to return the 
benefits conferred by others based on the norm of reciprocity (Blau, 1964).  
Temporary employees are hired without the employer’s promise of a long-term 
relationship.  Therefore, these employees are limited in their ability to enjoy 
inducements from the employer, by virtue of their employment contracts (Rousseau, 
1995).  When a company applies high involvement HR practices to temporary 
employees, these workers have the opportunity to develop skills, increase pay, and 
take on new job responsibilities.  As these benefits go beyond the expectation of 
temporary workers, they are likely to view the employer’s inducements even more 
positively than their permanent peers.   For example, van Dyne and Ang (1998) found 
that the relationship between organizational commitment and citizenship behavior is 
stronger for temporary workers than permanent workers, which suggests that 
temporary workers engage more in positive participatory behaviors when they 
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perceive the employer’s efforts to build commitment.  Therefore, the negative effects 
of alternative employment strategies on operational performance will be weaker when 
the employer adopts high involvement HR practices. 
Hypothesis 3:  The adoption of high involvement HR practices moderates the 
relationship between modes of alternative employment strategies and operational 
performance.  Specifically, the negative relationship between modes of alternative 
employment strategies and operational performance is lower when the company 
makes greater use of high involvement HR practices.  
 
METHODS 
Sample 
Data for this study were collected based on procedures discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Due to data availability of the performance measure, the final 
sample was reduced to eighty-two establishments.  Statistical analyses suggest that 
this sample did not differ from sample of Chapter 3 in the proportion of temporary 
employees in the workplaces.   
Measure 
Operational performance is measured as the extent to which a call center 
achieves its operational performance target.  Because of the metrics driven nature of 
performance management in call centers, this measure is a rather objective 
performance indicator.  This outcome ranged from zero to 100%, with a mean value at 
84.4%.  It is one of the key performance measures in call centers of various size and 
sectors.  It allows us to compare operational performance among call centers across 
different industries.   
I measured the adoption of alternative employment strategies as a categorical 
variable to capture its possible discrete, instead of continuous, effects on operational 
  81
performance.  I classified companies into four distinct modes of alternative 
employment strategies, depending on the proportion of temporary employees: no use 
(% temp = 0), low use (0< % temp <50), high use (50 ≤ % temp <1 00), complete use 
(% temp = 100).  Among all call centers in the sample, forty-one centers reported that 
they did not hire temporary workers (42.3%); thirty-one for the low use mode (32.0%); 
seventeen for the high use mode (17.5%); and eight for the complete use mode (8.2%).  
On average, temporary workers comprised 24.7% of the total workforce in centers of 
low use mode and 70.6% in centers of the high use mode.  I conducted additional 
analyses to test whether these four modes of alternative employment strategies 
significantly differed from each other in distribution of the use of temporary workers.  
Results supported this categorization of the study sample (T-values were 11.92, 10.27, 
4.76, all p<0.001).  
By measuring the adoption of alternative employment strategies as a 
categorical instead of a continuous variable, one might argue that the analysis loses 
some sensitivity in explaining the covariation between independent and dependent 
variables.  This argument is built upon the assumption that each additional unit change 
in the independent variable correlates to a continuous change in the dependent variable.  
However, researchers in the field of organizational demography and temporary 
employment have argued for categorical measures representing different modes of 
temporary employment, since shifts between modes (e.g., from low use to high use) 
represent critical qualitative shifts in employee interpretations of managerial choices, 
rather than quantitative changes in levels along a continuum (George, 2003; Uzzi & 
Barsness, 1998).  Because these theoretical arguments and the statistical results 
indicate that the categories differed from each other in their extent of externalization, I 
coded the adoption of alternative employment strategies as a categorical variable.  
Such a technique allows for modeling flexibility that the slopes of the regression lines 
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can vary for each mode of alternative employment strategies.   Therefore, this analysis 
makes possible differential forms of the relationship between the adoption of 
alternative employment strategies and operational performance, thus giving the 
potential to gain insights beyond a continuous measure of the proportion of temporary 
workers.   
I used a set of theoretically driven HR practices to measure high involvement 
HR practices, drawing upon my field work and prior studies in call centers (Batt, 2002; 
Doellgast, 2008).  I used three indices to capture different dimensions of high 
involvement HR practices (see included HR practices in Appendix).  The first 
dimension relates to high skill requirements.  This includes educational level, initial 
training, and the amount of time for a new employee to reach job competence. The 
second dimension provides opportunity for employees to use their skills in 
collaboration with other workers and participation in workplace decisions. This 
includes the use of self-managed teams, quality circles, job discretion, and flexible job 
descriptions.  The third dimension provides an incentive structure that enhances 
motivation and commitment. This includes ongoing training, the extent of electronic 
performance monitoring (reverse coded), and performance-base variable pay.  For 
employees, electronic monitoring is a source of stress and signals distrust by managers 
(Batt & Moynihan, 2002; Deery, Iverson, & Walsh 2002; Holman, Chissick, & 
Totterdell 2002).  To create the index of each dimension, I transformed the variables 
to z-scores and calculated the mean value of the variables.  Following prior strategic 
human resource management research, I created an additive index of the ten HR 
practices in order to test the models of moderation.  The high-involvement HR 
practices index was transformed into a z-score and then interacted with each mode of 
alternative employment strategies.   
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Finally, I included a set of control variables based on prior literature, including 
ownership and industry.  I also controlled for call centers that was a subunit of a larger 
organization, that were operated in-house rather than subcontracted by a third party, 
and that primarily handled inbound calls instead of outbound calls (an indicator of task 
complexity).  
 
RESULTS  
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations.  The 
results suggest that high use and complete use modes of alternative employment 
strategies are negatively correlated with the level of target performance achieved while 
high involvement HR practices index has a positive association.  However, these 
effects are small and insignificant. 
I conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses.  In this 
procedure, the control variables were entered in Step 1, variables of alternative 
employment strategies were entered in Step 2, and indices of high involvement HR 
practices were included in Step 3.  The interaction terms between modes of alternative 
employment strategies and high involvement HR practices were entered in Step 4.  All 
variables included in the interaction terms were standardized prior to creating the 
interaction terms.  Table 4.2 shows the regression coefficients and R-squares 
associated with each step. 
Model 1 tested the effects of control variables.  Compared to those of domestic 
private ownership, call centers run by state-owned and foreign companies reached 
higher levels of target operational performance.  Performance levels were lower in call 
centers in the telecommunications industries and higher in the financial industry, in 
relation to those in other industries.  In addition, establishment characteristics such as  
  
84
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Target performance achieved (%) 0.844 0.165       
Alternative employment strategies     
2. No use (% temp=0) 0.423 0.497 0.076     
3. Low use (0<%temp<50) 0.320 0.469 0.025 -0.5864*     
4. High use (50≤%temp<100) 0.175 0.382 -0.017 -0.3944* -0.316    
5. Complete use (%temp=100) 0.082 0.277 -0.146 -0.257 -0.206 -0.138   
High involvement HR practices   
6. Skill index 0.000 2.096 0.280 0.312 -0.251 0.025 -0.170  
7. Work design index 0.000 2.468 -0.020 0.010 0.079 -0.054 -0.077 0.081
8. HR incentive index 0.000 1.769 0.055 0.009 -0.027 -0.113 0.186 -0.190
9. High involvement (HI) system index 0.000 3.626 0.180 0.191 -0.104 -0.077 -0.060 0.5406*
10. Ownership: state-owned  0.309 0.465 0.019 -0.031 -0.172 0.220 0.043 -0.051
11. Ownership: foreign 0.134 0.342 0.168 -0.030 -0.140 0.057 0.212 0.163
12. Subunit of a larger organization 0.897 0.306 -0.024 0.153 -0.204 0.067 -0.022 0.239
13. In-house operations 1.208 0.408 -0.146 -0.121 0.249 -0.036 -0.155 -0.237
14. Inbound services 0.794 0.407 0.142 -0.131 -0.033 0.101 0.153 0.205
15. Industry: telecommunications 0.330 0.473 -0.181 -0.201 -0.011 0.023 0.348 -0.194
16. Industry: financial industry 0.289 0.455 0.014 0.238 -0.193 0.065 -0.191 0.3612*
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
 
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
8. HR incentive index 0.012         
9. High involvement (HI) system index 0.7332* 0.3861*        
10. Ownership: state-owned  -0.134 0.053 -0.095       
11. Ownership: foreign -0.012 -0.041 0.066 -0.263       
12. Subunit of a larger organization 0.133 -0.114 0.173 0.227 0.133      
13. In-house operations -0.003 0.043 -0.118 -0.18 0.022 -0.245     
14. Inbound services -0.026 -0.148 0.029 0.231 -0.024 0.162 -0.4316*    
15. Industry: telecommunications -0.04 0.084 -0.098 0.005 0.175 -0.051 0.3990* -0.022   
16. Industry: financial industry 0.038 -0.026 0.222 0.017 0.017 0.141 0.193 0.044 0.134
 
* Significant at .05 level; Bonferroni adjusted.
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Table 4.2 
Effects of Alternative Employment Strategies and  
High Involvement HR Practices on Operational Performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Alternative employment strategies     
     
Low use   0.011 -0.003 0.002 0.006 
(0<%temp<50)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
      
High use   -0.036 -0.025 -0.025 0.001 
(50≤%temp<100)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
      
Complete use  -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.061*** 
(%temp=100)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
      
High involvement HR Practices     
     
Skill index   0.022*   
   (0.012)   
      
Work design index   0.014**   
   (0.007)   
      
HR incentive index   0.008   
   (0.012)   
      
High involvement     0.058*** 0.037* 
(HI) system index    (0.020) (0.021) 
      
Moderation effects      
      
 Low use of alternative 
employment strategies  
    0.006 
×HI system index     (0.022) 
      
High use of alternative 
employment strategies 
    0.055* 
×HI system index     (0.029) 
      
Complete use of 
alternative employment 
strategies  
    0.049*** 
×HI system index     (0.013) 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
 
Control variables      
      
Ownership: state-owned  0.085** 0.111*** 0.092** 0.080* 0.076** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.037) 
      
Ownership: foreign 0.080* 0.176*** 0.155*** 0.139*** 0.078* 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.041) 
      
Subunit of a larger 0.036 -0.035 -0.070 -0.064 -0.039 
organization (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.044) 
      
In-house operations 0.069 0.007 0.051 0.029 -0.011 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.052) (0.044) (0.043) 
      
Inbound services 0.020 0.101** 0.125*** 0.133*** 0.076* 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
      
Industry:  -0.093** 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.032 
telecommunications (0.036) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039) 
      
Industry:  0.078** -0.008 -0.034 -0.013 0.004 
      financial industry (0.038) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045) 
      
Constant 0.702*** 0.732*** 0.716*** 0.726*** 0.810*** 
 (0.103) (0.092) (0.093) (0.087) (0.088) 
      
R2 0.165 0.374 0.454 0.442 0.577 
      
 
1.  n=82. 
2. No use of alternative employment strategies (%temp=0) is set as the omitted category. 
3. Standard errors in parentheses 
4. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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in-house operations and inbound services were not found to be significant predictors 
of operational effectiveness.  These control variables explain 16.5 percent of the total 
variance. 
To test Hypothesis 1, I introduced different modes of alternative employment 
strategies in Model 2.  No use of alternative employment strategies (i.e., all workers 
are permanent hires) was taken as the omitted category.  Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
the use of alternative employment strategies is negatively related to operational 
performance.  Hypothesis 1 is moderately supported by the results.  Establishments 
that make low or high use of temporary workers do not differ significantly from those 
that hire permanent employees only.  However, call centers that make complete use of 
temporary workers are 7 percent lower than those of the no use mode in reaching 
performance targets (p<.01).  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the adoption of high involvement HR practices is 
positively associated with operational performance.  Results strongly support this 
finding.  As suggested by Model 3, one standard deviation increase of the skill index is 
associated with a 2.2% increase in reaching performance target (p<.10).  One standard 
deviation increase of the work design index is associated with a 1.4% increase in 
reaching performance target (p<.05).  The independent effect of HR incentives index 
is not significant.  Moreover, the performance effect of the additive index is significant.  
Model 4 suggests that one standard deviation increase in the high-involvement HR 
practices index is associated with an 5.8% increase in reaching performance target 
(p<.01).   
To test the moderation effects, I introduced a set of interaction terms in Model 
5.  The results moderately support Hypotheses 3.  The findings show that when 
companies use a large number of temporary employees (i.e., the high use and the 
complete use modes), the negative effects of alternative employment strategies on 
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operational performance are weaker when the use of high involvement HR practices is 
high.  Using points one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the 
means of high involvement HR practices, I plotted the interactions in Figure 4.2.  As 
shown, compared to establishments that make greater use of high involvement HR 
practices, the negative effect between alternative employment strategies and 
performance is much stronger among establishments that are low in high involvement 
HR practices.  The hypothesized moderation effect is supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Interactions between Alternative Employment Strategies and  
High Involvement HR Practices in Predicting Operational Performance 
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Figure 4.2 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study examines the relationships between alternative employment 
strategies, high involvement HR practices, and operational effectiveness.   The 
findings suggest that organizations pursuing alternative employment strategies to low 
labor costs or to increase numerical flexibility should consider the performance costs 
associated with their decisions.  By virtue of their work status, employees hired on 
temporary contracts may withhold commitment and job efforts because they do not 
have a positive attitude toward their relationship with the employer.  For example, 
they may be less willing to invest in firm-specific skills and to take on responsibilities 
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that are not specified in the contracts.  This problem is more severe when most work 
activities are performed by temporary employees.  Nevertheless, such a negative effect 
can be mitigated by the use of high involvement HR practices.  This suggests, when 
the employer offers opportunities of skill development, empowerment, and rewards to 
temporary workers, they will increase work motivation and commitment, which in 
turn leads to job efforts, willfulness to collaborate, and other behaviors that boost 
bottom-line performance.   
This study contributes to prior HR research in several important ways.  First, 
this study provides support for ideal that various combinations of temporary and 
permanent employment relationships can be conceptualized as distinct models, rather 
than a continuous variable. Previous studies generally have adopted a homogenous 
approach and examined the effects of the proportion of temporary employees on 
organizational outcomes.  But the results of the considerable empirical research on the 
effects of temporary employees have been inclusive.  My theoretical arguments drawn 
from literature on organizational demography as well as empirical results are 
suggestive of an alternative approach of conceptualizing the use of temporary work as 
different modes, depending on the relative number of temporary employees.  This 
approach enables us to account for different power relations and social processes that 
result from the relative mix of temporary and permanent contracts, which in turn affect 
organizational effectiveness.  
Second, this study advances our knowledge by taking an integration view of 
functional and numerical flexibility.  Findings suggest that the use of high 
involvement HR practices moderates the relationship between alternative employment 
strategies and operational performance.  In particular, when firms effectively integrate 
temporary workers by adopting HR practices that provide opportunities for 
development, discretionary efforts, and job motivation, they can minimize the adverse 
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effect of alternative employment strategies on performance.  Unfortunately, in practice, 
companies often invest little resources or time in the development and retention of 
temporary employees, because they are often driven by efficiency motives.  Recent 
changes in labor legislations (both in China and in the U.S.) further discourage these 
attempts by affirming that the integration of temporary workers into daily operations 
can determine the client firm, rather than temporary staffing agencies, is the legal 
employer.  The desire to avoid employer obligations may cause companies to 
deliberately separate temporary workers from permanent co-workers.  As a result, 
these decisions may stifle the contributions of temporary workers and increase their 
intention to quit.   
There are several limitations to this study. First, data collected from a single 
respondent may raise concerns about measurement error and biases.  I mitigated this 
concern by using establishment level surveys.  Establishment-level surveys are 
relatively reliable because the numbers of employees are smaller, the managers are 
familiar with the HR practices they are responsible for implementing, and the HR 
practices are more homogeneous (Batt, 2002). 
A second concern is the question of simultaneity.  Because all of the measures 
were collected contemporaneously, it is impossible to draw strong causal inferences 
between high involvement HR practices, alternative employment strategies, and 
organizational performance.  It would be worthwhile for future research to explicitly 
test the causal effects among these variables by using longitudinal research strategies 
or quasi-experimental designs.  
Third, this study focuses on a single organizational outcome – the extent to 
which an establishment meets its operational target – as the dependent variable.  I was 
not able to test whether the adverse effect on operational performance is offset by 
labor savings of temporary employment.  Future research is encouraged to explore a 
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boarder range of employee outcomes and organizational performance, such as 
turnover, labor productivity, sales, and revenue. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The previous chapters examined the spread of temporary employment 
contracts and its effects on organizational outcomes.  As suggested by the findings in 
these studies, we are witnessing more than the proliferation of temporary employment 
relationships.  Instead, these changes reveal important information about the 
transformation of employment systems in China, within which the traditional practice 
of stable employment has begun to deinstitutionalize and the scope and significance of 
temporary work relationships have been markedly extended. 
While the imperative of economic efficiency is reaffirmed, the studies 
highlight that the adoption of temporary employment contracts may heavily depend on 
the interests and power of actors that make decisions in organizations.  For example, I 
find that line managers, finance managers, and top corporate leaders have incentives to 
expand the temporary workforce for various reasons.  Line managers seek more 
autonomy and authority in the work place by hiring temporary employees whom are 
not covered by formal employment policies and whom they have more control over.  
Finance managers support the use of short-term contracts because it facilitates the use 
of financial measures in internal capital allocations and improves a firm’s financial 
performance from the view of investors.  Finally, executive officers at state-owned 
enterprises are in favor of externalizing low-income jobs because it gives the company 
more discretion in designing executive compensation plans.  Together, these findings 
indicate that organization actions reflect the political struggles in which different 
actors are engaged in contests over organizational goals and rules of action, pointing 
to the importance of power, ideology, and self-interests, rather efficiency 
maximization.  To extend this line of research, future studies may explore how goal 
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interdependence among organizational units shapes managerial control over 
workplace decisions and therefore influences the perceived benefits associated with 
the use of temporary employment contracts.  
The findings also suggest that the firms do not only use temporary employment 
contracts to accommodate unexpected, short-term personnel needs.  Rather, the use of 
temporary contract and the use of temporary staffing agencies create legal distance 
between an employer and workers, and therefore allow the employer to avoid legal 
liability.  As such, firms are able to reshape the future responsibilities and obligations 
involved in employment relationships and hedge unfavorable risks.  That is, even in 
the face of slack labor markets and booming business demands, firms have incentives 
to adopt temporary employment contracts in order to reduce economic uncertainties.  
This finding is consistent with research on the “gloves-off” economy, which argues 
that employers may use temporary contracts as evasion strategies so that they can 
diverge from the long-established legal and normative standards that govern 
employment relationships and job quality (Bernhardt, Boushey, Dresser, & Tilly, 
2008). 
Although prior research suggests that equity investors in financial markets 
exercise control over employment practices by defining organizational objectives and 
managerial ideology (Black, Gospel & Pendleton, 2007; Froud, Haslam, Johal, & 
Williams, 2000), very little research has empirically examined such differences.  
Based on the empirical setting in China, this research provides strong evidence that 
publicly listed companies are positively associated with the adoption of temporary 
employment contracts.  Equity investors tend to view corporation as the property of 
shareholders and employees merely one factor of production.  Under these pressures 
exerted by equity investors, managers strive to enhance the fluidity of production 
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inputs and to increase short-term returns, while discounting investment in intangible 
assets such as human resources. 
Furthermore, prior literature has assumed that maximization of stock prices is 
the common goal of all investors.  In this research, I challenge this assumption and 
develop theoretical arguments to examine why financial investors in different trading 
markets may establish heterogeneous objectives and therefore adopt systematically 
different employment practices.  In particular, compared to those listed on the NYSE, 
companies listed on the NASDAQ make lower use of temporary employment 
contracts because of concentration of share ownership, insider representation on 
boards, and an entrepreneurial tendency to favor risks and opportunities.  In addition, 
findings also suggest that due to differences in owner characteristics, governance 
structures, and the institutional environment, companies listed on Chinese stock 
exchanges make significantly less use of temporary employment contracts cokmpared 
to those traded on the NYSE exchange. 
Although many employers believe that the use of temporary contracts 
enhances numerical flexibility and reduces labor cots, prior research has not 
systematically examined its performance implications.  In this research, I explore the 
relationship between alternative employment strategies, high involvement HR 
practices, and operational performance.  Drawing upon literature on organizational 
demography, I conceptualize alternative employment strategies as distinct 
combinations of permanent and temporary employees.  Findings suggest that an 
extensive use of temporary employment contracts (i.e., 50% or more of the workforce 
are temporary) have a detrimental effect on an organization’s operation effectiveness.  
These findings are consistent with prior conceptual work that temporary employees 
are less motivated because of limited inducements and commitment from the employer.  
However, the adverse effect can be mitigated when the company applies high 
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involvement HR practices to temporary employees.  High involvement HR practices 
give employees the opportunities to develop skills, increase pay, and use discretionary 
efforts at work.  As these inducements go beyond the expectation of temporary 
employees, they respond in a way more positively than permanent employees. 
In conclusion, qualitative fieldwork and quantitative results of this research 
suggest a series of strategic motives for why firms make increasing use of temporary 
employment contracts.  In addition to the provision of low-cost and short-term labor, 
managers strategically adopt temporary employment contracts to cope with complex 
and sometimes contradictory pressures inside and outside the organization, such as 
goal conflicts between organizational units, expectations from shareholders, and 
regulations of labor laws.  However, using temporary workers as part of HR strategies 
can be detrimental to a company’s performance.  The adoption of high involvement 
HR practices can mitigate such a negative effect.  Firms need to be particularly 
cognizant of these implications in the use of temporary employment contracts. 
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APPENDICES 
 
2.1 Field Work and Data Collection 
 
Company Principle activities Names and titles of 
interviewees 
Location Industry Research activities Hours of 
field 
work 
1. Air China Customer Service Dong, Y.  
General manager 
Beijing Airline Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
4
      
2. Amssy Customer Service Huan, H.  
General manager 
Beijing Retail, cosmetics Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
3. Bank of China Customer Service Xie, L 
HR manager 
Beijing Banking Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
4. CCID Third-party vendor Yang, H.  
General manager 
Beijing Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
5. China 
Construction Bank 
Marketing and sales Liu, G.  
General manager 
Shanghai Banking Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
6. China Life Customer Service Yuan, L.  
General manager 
Beijing Insurance Face-to-face 
interview 
1
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7. China Mobile Customer Service Wang, X.  
HR manager 
Nanjing Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview and survey 
1
      
8. China Mobile Customer Service Song, Y.  
General manager 
Beijing Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview (two) 
3
      
9. China Motion Third-party vendor Wen, G.  
General manager 
Hangzhou Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
4
      
10. China Motion Third-party vendor Li, C.  
General manager 
Yang, L.  
HR manager 
Shenzhen Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview and on-site 
visit 
2
      
11. China Netcom Customer Service Shi, S.  
General manager 
Hangzhou Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
12. China Telecom Customer Service Xiong, D.  
General manager 
Bao, Z. HR manager 
Shenzhen Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1
      
13. China Telecom Customer Service Zhang, J.  
General manager 
Hangzhou Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
14. ChinaHR.com Customer Service Tang, S.  
General manager 
Beijing HR services Face-to-face 
interview 
4
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15. Ctrip Customer Service Sun, M.  
General manager 
Shanghai Leisure services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
4
      
16. De Min Customer Service Zhang, X.  
General manager 
Beijing Retail Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
17. Dell Customer Service Guo, L. HR manager Dalian IT manufacturing on-site visit 0.5
      
18. DHC Third-party vendor Wang, L.  
General manager 
Dalian Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
19. Elong Customer Service Sun, Y.  
General manager 
Beijing Leisure services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
20. Far East Third-party vendor  Liu, R.  
General manager 
Chen, L.  
HR manager 
Shanghai Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
6
      
21. FESCO Customer Service Xi, M.  
HR manager 
Beijing HR services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
22. Founder Customer Service Gao, S.  
General manager 
Beijing IT manufacturing Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
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22. Genpact Third-party vendor Chen, X.  
HR manager 
Dalian Financial services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit
and survey 
2
      
23. Genpact Third-party vendor Qu, J.  
HR manager 
Dalian Medical services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
24. HiChina.com Customer Service Li, D.  
General manager 
Beijing Internet services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
25. HP Global Service 
Center 
Liu, H.  
General manager 
Dalian IT manufacturing Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
6
      
26. Jin Wan Bao Customer Service Yuan, J.  
HR manager 
Tianjin Newspaper Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
27. Lenovo Customer Service Shi., P.X.,  
General manager 
Beijing IT manufacturing Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
28. Lenovo  Sales Wang, F.  
General manager 
Beijing IT manufacturing Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
29. LG Electronics Customer Service Wang, L.  Beijing Manufacturing Face-to-face 3
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General manager interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
      
30. Liba.com Customer Service Xu, X.  
General manager 
Shanghai Internet services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
31. Medtronic Customer Service Li. Y. General 
manager 
Beijing Medical services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
32. Microsoft Customer Service Yuan, X.  
General manager 
Beijing Software Face-to-face 
interview, and on-site 
visit 
1
      
33. My12580.com Third-party vendor Li, W.  
General manager 
Beijing Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview  
1
      
34. Net.cn Customer Service Tang, C. General 
manager 
Beijing Internet services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
35. New China Life Customer Service Zhu, X.  
HR manager 
Beijing Insurance Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
36. New Oriental Customer Service Lin, C.  
HR manager 
Beijing Education Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
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37. Sina.com Customer Service Zhong, Y.  
General manager 
Beijing Internet services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
38. State Tax Customer Service Gao, Y.  
General manager 
Dalian Public services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
39. Tai Gong Third-party vendor Ge, M.  
General manager 
Beijing Retail Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
40. Tai Kang Customer Service Ye, Y.  
HR manager 
Beijing Insurance Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
41. 
Teleperformance 
Third-party vendor Zhang, Y.  
General manager 
Beijing Telecommunicatio
ns 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
42. Wicresoft Third-party vendor Xu, X.  
General manager 
Shanghai Software Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
43. Xinyuan Boya Customer Service Pu, X.  
General manager 
Beijing Interpreter 
services 
Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
2
      
44. Xinyuan Boya Customer Service Hu, T.  
HR manager 
Beijing Lottery services Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
2
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and survey 
      
45. ZTE Customer Service Tan, H.  
General manager 
Shanghai IT manufacturing Face-to-face 
interview, on-site visit 
and survey 
3
      
    Total hours of field work: 114.5
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3.1 Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent Variables: Proportion of Temporary Workers 
this measure is formed from the following 
 
“How many customer contact employees work at this center now?” 
________number, <d> do not know  <r> refused 
 
“Think about temporary employees who are hired directly or through agencies for 
short-term or temporary contracts.  How many temporary customer contact 
employees work at your centre now?” 
____number, <d> do not know  <r> refused 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Labor Market Conditions 
 
Access to skilled workforce 
“Please rate the significance of presence of skilled workforce of operating in this 
local geographic area.”   
<1> Not at all 
<2> A little 
<3> A moderate level 
<4> A lot 
<5> A great deal 
 
Access to low-wage workforce 
“Please rate the significance of low wages of operating in this local geographic 
area.”   
<1> Not at all 
<2> A little 
<3> A moderate level 
<4> A lot 
<5> A great deal 
 
Product Market Conditions 
 
Is the primary market served by your call centre local (city or county), regional 
(state or   province), national, or international? (Interviewer -check one only) 
<1> Local  
<2> Regional 
<3> National 
<4> International 
<d> Do not know    
<r> Refused                                    
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Political Conditions 
 
Use of state resources: is the total types of resources used 
“To what extent has this center used any of the following public resources?  
(answer Yes or No)” 
a. Job recruitment and placement services    
b. Training resources or programs  
c. Site location assistance 
d. Tax abatements 
 
State ownership: is a dummy variable 
1 = state-owned enterprises 
2 = other types of ownership arrangements 
 
Capital Market Conditions 
 
Non-listing status 
“Is the organization a public listing company?” 
<1> Yes 
<0> No 
(In order to set the NYSE listed companies as the base category in the statistical 
analyses, I coded non-listed companies as 1 and listed companies as 0). 
 
Capital market of public listing: is a set of dummy variables.  I collected 
information from company archives and public information sources.  
New York Stock Exchanges (NYSE) 
National Association of Securities Deals Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) 
Chinese Stock Exchanges 
Other stock exchanges 
 
Control Variables 
 
Organization Size 
 
“How many customer contact employees work at this center now?” 
________number 
 
Organization Age 
 
In what year was this call centre established? 
<1950-2007> Year 
 
Part of a Larger Organization  
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“Is this call center part of a larger organization?” 
<1> Yes 
   <0> No 
 
In-house Operations 
 
“How would you best describe your call centre – as an in-house centre providing 
services to your company or as a sub-contractor providing services to other 
companies? (Please tick one)” 
 <1> In-house operation 
 <2> Subcontractor 
  
Industry   
 
“From the following list, which industry sector or sectors do you serve? “ 
 
“If you serve more than one sector, please can you state in which single industry 
you do the most business?” 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Outbound Operations 
“Which type of calls comprises the largest volume of calls at your centre?” 
<1> Inbound <2> Outbound 
 
Regional Minimum Wage 
Collected from China Labor Statistics Yearbook 2006 
 
 
Insurance Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Local Government Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Banking (Financial Services) Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Central Government Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Charity/Voluntary Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Health Care (including NHS) Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Manufacturing Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Distribution Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Utilities Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Pharmaceuticals Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Retail Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Construction Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Telecommunications Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Housing Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Hotels, Lodging Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Food and Drink Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Airlines Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Recreation and Leisure Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Media Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Publishing and Printing Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Public Sector Services Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Other                ___________________________ 
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 4.1 Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent Variables: Operational Performance 
 
“I want to learn more about the operational performance of your call centre.” 
“Do you have a target time for incoming/outgoing calls to be answered by?” 
<1> Yes    <0> No   <d> do not know  <r> refused 
 
 “What percent of calls are answered within the target time?” (in-bound call 
centers only) 
<0-100> percent    
 
 “What percent of calls are completed within the target time?” (out-bound call 
centers only) 
<0-100> percent    
 
Independent Variables 
 
Modes of Alternative Employment Strategies: 
this measure is a categorical measure formed from the following 
 
“How many customer contact employees work at this center now?” 
________number, <d> do not know  <r> refused 
 
“Think about temporary employees who are hired directly or through agencies for 
short-term or temporary contracts.  How many temporary customer contact 
employees work at your centre now?” 
____number, <d> do not know  <r> refused 
 
“Are the majority of your core employees permanent or temporary?” 
<1> Permanent 
<2> Temporary  
<d> Do not know  
<r> Refused 
 
High Involvement HR Practices 
 
Skill dimension 
 
Education credentials 
“What is the typical educational level of a typical employee?” 
<1> No qualifications         
<2> Junior high school (9 years)      
<3> General high school diploma (12 years) 
<4> Associate degree (14-15 years)  
  109
<5> Bachelor degree (16 years) 
<6> Masters degree or above (18 years or more) 
 <d> Do not know   <r> Refused 
 
Initial training 
“How many days of initial training do core employees receive in their first year 
(including orientation/induction and job-related training)?”  
<0-300> days   <d> Do not know <r> Refused 
 
Job competency requirement 
“How much time does it take for a core employee to become fully competent on 
the job? E.g. so that they are able to train someone else.”  
<0-30> weeks  <d> Do not know <r> Refused 
 
Work design dimension 
 
Self-management teams 
What percentage of core employees are organized into self-managed or semi 
autonomous team?  (That is, teams in which employees supervise their own work 
and make their own decisions about tasks or work methods)? 
<0-100> Percent <d> Do not know <r> Refused   
 
Quality circles 
What percentage of core employees participate with supervisors or managers in 
task forces, problem-solving groups, or quality improvement committees? 
<0-100> Percent   <d> Do not know <r> Refused   
 
 
Job discretion: is a scale formed from the following items 
“Now, I would like to understand how much discretion core employees have at 
work.  On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is no discretion and 5 is a great deal of 
discretion, how much discretion does the typical core employee have over:” 
 
a. What daily tasks or work assignments they do 
b. What methods or procedures they use 
c. The pace or speed at which they work 
d. What they say to a customer     
e. The design and use of new technology 
f. Setting their daily lunch & break schedule 
g. Sequencing their daily activities, jobs, or orders  
h. Handling additional requests or problems that may arise unexpectedly: 
i. Settling customer complaints without referral to a supervisor: 
(1= Not at all; 2= A little; 3= A moderate level; 4= A lot; 5= A great deal) 
 
Flexible job descriptions 
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“What percentage of core employees have flexible job descriptions not linked to 
specific tasks?” 
<0-100> Percent    <d> Do not know <r> Refused   
 
HR incentives dimensions 
Performance-based pay 
“About what percentage of gross annual pay of core employees comes from 
individual commission?” 
<0-100> percent   <d> Do not know <r> Refused 
 
Performance monitoring: is a scale formed from the following items (reverse 
coded) 
“How often do core employees receive computerized or quantitative feedback on 
their performance, for example, number of calls taken, call length, or number of 
sales?” 
<1> Rarely or never    
<2> Sporadically    
<3> Once a quarter     
<4> Once a month    
<5> Twice a month   
<6> Once a week   
<7> a few times a week    
<8> Every day 
 
“In practice, how often are the calls of experienced core employees (that is, with more 
than one year of tenure) listened to by a supervisor?”   
<1> Rarely or never    
<2> Sporadically    
<3> Once a quarter     
<4> Once a month    
<5> Twice a month   
<6> Once a week   
<7> a few times a week    
<8> Every day 
 
“To what extent is the information from performance monitoring used to support 
disciplinary actions, using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is not at all and 5 is a very 
great deal.  Would you say:” 
<1> Not at all 
<2> A little 
<3> A moderate level 
<4> A lot 
<5> A great deal 
 
Investment in general skills 
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“After the first year, how many days of formal training per year does the typical 
core employee receive?  Please include on-line, vendor, classroom or other formal 
training.”   
<0-60>  days   <d> Do not know <r> Refused   
 
Control Variables 
 
Organization Size 
 
“How many customer contact employees work at this center now?” 
________number 
 
Organization Age 
 
In what year was this call centre established? 
<1950-2007> Year 
 
Part of a Larger Organization  
 
“Is this call center part of a larger organization?” 
<1> Yes 
   <0> No 
 
In-house Operations 
 
“How would you best describe your call centre – as an in-house centre providing 
services to your company or as a sub-contractor providing services to other 
companies? (Please tick one)” 
 <1> In-house operation 
 <2> Subcontractor 
  
Industry   
 
“From the following list, which industry sector or sectors do you serve? “ 
 
Insurance Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Local Government Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Banking (Financial Services) Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Central Government Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Charity/Voluntary Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Health Care (including NHS) Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Manufacturing Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Distribution Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Utilities Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Pharmaceuticals Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Retail Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Construction Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Telecommunications Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Housing Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Hotels, Lodging Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Food and Drink Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Airlines Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Recreation and Leisure Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Media Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Publishing and Printing Yes [  ]  No  [  ]
Public Sector Services Yes [  ]  No  [  ] Other                ___________________________ 
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“If you serve more than one sector, please can you state in which single industry 
you do the most business?” 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Outbound Operations 
“Which type of calls comprises the largest volume of calls at your centre?” 
<1> Inbound <2> Outbound 
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